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Feminism and the Historical
Dynamics of Change
Serena Mayeri
Using a historical case study, this Article seeks to uncover how advo-
cates of change construct and confront constitutional choices. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, activists concerned with women 's legal status struggled
to define and effectuate a platform of constitutional change. After decades
of bitter division over the Equal Rights Amendment, they overcame long-
standing racial, class, and ideological rifts to unite around a dual strat-
egy--the simultaneous pursuit of a constitutional amendment and judicial
reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article explores the
dual strategy's formulation, articulation, and execution, examining the
costs and benefits of building and implementing this nascent feminist con-
sensus. It concludes by considering the dual strategy's legacy in constitu-
tional sex equality jurisprudence and briefly reflecting upon the stakes of
the choices facing today's advocates of constitutional change.
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-first-century constitutional sex equality jurisprudence is re-
plete with apparent contradictions. In 1996, the Supreme Court resound-
ingly disapproved the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), announcing a muscular "skeptical scrutiny" for sex-based
classifications that some heralded as the judicial enactment of an Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA).' But five years later, a majority of justices ap-
plied a much less robust version of intermediate scrutiny to uphold a sex-
differentiating citizenship law.2 In 2000, the Court struck down the
Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedy as an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power,3 then surprised observers three years later
by sustaining the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as a valid legis-
lative attempt to combat sex discrimination under Section five of the
1. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
2. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Fourteenth Amendment.4 Present-day political alignments and calculations
play an important role in shaping doctrinal outcomes, but the roots of these
decisions also lie in the constitutional choices of the past. This Article
chronicles the creation of the feminist legal strategy that helped to shape
our current constitutional landscape.'
In the 1960s, advocates concerned with women's legal rights-a
group I will call "legal feminists"--were embroiled in a long-standing,
passionate, and divisive dispute over whether their goal of equal justice
under the law could best be achieved through an ERA or through judicial
reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This constitutional choice
had profound affective and symbolic significance, implicating personal and
political loyalties that transcended the provisions' text. For some,
Fourteenth Amendment litigation was strongly associated with protection-
ism, concern for working-class women, and solidarity with racial minori-
ties, while the ERA connoted formal equality, elitism, and even white
supremacy. For others, the Fourteenth Amendment was a debilitating de-
coy designed to sap constitutional change of its egalitarian power. For a
third group, increasingly, the choice between litigation and constitutional
amendment pursuant to Article V6 was a pragmatic one. These pragmatists,
led by African-American civil rights attorney and pioneering feminist Pauli
Murray, asked which avenue of constitutional change would most expedi-
tiously unite a diverse group of activists around a common legal strategy
and would most likely succeed in the larger political universe. Thanks in
no small measure to the leadership of Murray and her allies, and aided by
the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by the early 1970s
legal feminists had overcome their differences and settled on a dual consti-
tutional strategy: the simultaneous pursuit of constitutional change through
formal amendment and judicial reinterpretation. The process by which they
achieved this accord is recounted in Part I of this Article.
4. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
5. As the Court claims a superior prerogative to define constitutional rights and powers, scholars
have begun to excavate and emphasize the central role played by extrajudicial sources in the creation of
constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) [hereinafter Post
& Siegel, Equal Protection by Law]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE
L.J. 1943 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Consitutionalism]; Reva B. Siegel, Text in
Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297
(2001); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Channeling]; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100
MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects]; Edward L. Rubin, Passing
Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001).




Part I further explores how consensus proved to be a mixed blessing.
On the positive side, feminist convergence around the dual approach fi-
nally ended the opportunistic alliances some ERA proponents had forged
with racial segregationists. In its early stages, the dual strategy also led to a
reinvigoration of the movement's ideals and goals. Activists who sought
judicial reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment put forth an expan-
sive constitutional vision that embraced the interconnectedness of race and
sex equality. Advocates of a constitutional amendment developed propos-
als for new versions of the ERA that linked the principle of sex nondis-
crimination to reproductive freedom and racial justice. In the end, though,
unity came at a price. Advocates' failure to obtain a favorable court deci-
sion under the Fourteenth Amendment on the issue of Southern jury ser-
vice stymied an avenue of reform that linked women's rights with issues of
race and class. The insistence of longtime ERA supporters upon retaining
the ERA's original wording further constrained legal feminists' constitu-
tional choices, dooming more capacious visions of equality. Indeed, study-
ing the constitutional choices legal feminists faced during the 1960s helps
to explain the emergence of what critics of post-1970 jurisprudence 7 have
identified as a formalistic, exclusive, and impoverished notion of equality,
one that severed feminism from other social justice causes and benefited
the privileged classes at the expense of the poor and women of color.'
Part II demonstrates that implementing the dual strategy-the legal
feminist project of the 1970s-also involved both advantages and pitfalls.
On the one hand, legal feminists' unprecedented unity made the seventies
an auspicious decade for surmounting the judicial obstinacy that had long
rankled women's rights advocates. As Congress and the Court considered
women's constitutional demands, legal feminists enthusiastically promoted
the dual strategy, insisting that they were entitled to seek constitutional
change through formal amendment and judicial reinterpretation simultane-
ously. The interaction of these processes had many salutary consequences
for feminists, but the hazards of a dual approach soon became apparent.
While some jurists believed that congressional passage of the ERA
7. Mary Becker's focus on the 1960s is exceptional. See Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to
Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
209 (1998).
8. For a sampling of such critiques, see Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA.
L. REV. 861 (1997); Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043
(1987); Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991);
Catharine MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (1987) (book review). For a
trenchant critique of the assimilationist tendencies in equal protection doctrine more generally, see
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998).
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militated in favor of judicial reinterpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, others felt that the Court was obliged to await the outcome of
ERA ratification procedures. Just as ERA advocacy could limit feminists'
litigation successes, progress in the courts made an ERA seem less neces-
sary.9 The dual strategy, born of pragmatism, spawned its own practical
conundrums.
Part III first considers the paradoxes of legal feminists' pragmatism,
noting that while Pauli Murray's intersectional perspective was an impor-
tant impetus for the dual strategy, her indefatigable attempts to place
African-American women at the center of constitutional change were only
partially successful. Further, the dual strategy itself was doomed to achieve
only a partial triumph, encouraging the Supreme Court to adopt a height-
ened standard of review for sex-based classifications but also providing a
rationale for stopping short of the strict scrutiny standard legal feminists
sought.
The paradoxes of the dual strategy's legacy reverberate across our
constitutional landscape to this day. Part III goes on to argue that the seem-
ingly contradictory outcomes of recent constitutional sex equality cases
reflect many of the strengths and limitations of legal feminism as it devel-
oped in the 1960s and 1970s. While the strategy legal feminists pursued
was not outcome-determinative by any means, the constrained choices
feminists made echo through contemporary constitutional discourse."
The Article concludes with a brief consideration of current constitu-
tional controversies. While the historical particularity and contingency of
the legal feminist experience caution against generalization, differences as
well as similarities across time and context shed light on the stakes of ad-
vocates' constitutional choices today. Not only do these choices shape the
way courts and other decision makers ultimately conceptualize equality,
9. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 48-59 (1986); MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY
ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 99-
100 (1986).
10. For fascinating accounts of other constitutional roads not taken, see William E. Forbath,
Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing a "social citizenship"
tradition that grapples with class inequality and economic justice in a way that the jurisprudence of
formal racial equality does not); Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of
Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609 (2001) (tracing an alternative path to racial and economic justice
through the Thirteenth Amendment explored by Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers in the 1940s);
James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of
American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002) (detailing the labor
movement's Thirteenth Amendment theory of economic justice and its demise at the hands of
progressive lawyers); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (describing the wide range of social




but the act of choosing in turn constructs the social movements that mobi-
lize for change. 1
I
BUILDING A STRATEGY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE ERA, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ROADS NOT TAKEN
As the turbulent 1960s began, women seeking to transform their legal
and constitutional status faced two equally formidable obstacles: judicial
intransigence and internal dissension. "Despite the enlightened
emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone
years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly
considered to be reserved to men," wrote Justice John Marshall Harlan in
the 1961 case Hoyt v. Florida, "woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life."' 2 Such ambivalence about women's proper public
and private roles permeated American law at the federal, state, and local
levels. Even among women's advocates, long-standing antagonisms di-
vided supporters of an ERA from those dedicated to preserving hard-won
protective labor legislation for women. As the Warren Court increasingly
embraced a revolution in African Americans' legal status, women's rights
leaders disagreed, sometimes bitterly, over their cause's relationship to the
civil rights movement. Meanwhile, the dominant constitutional discourse
allowed little room for heightened scrutiny of sex-discriminatory laws,
given women's inability to claim the "discrete and insular minority"' 3
status that rationalized judicial remediation of invidious legal distinctions
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Part examines the choice between two principal modes of consti-
tutional change that legal feminists faced during the 1960s. By relating the
story of how feminists overcame deep divisions over the ERA, the first two
sections show the extent to which internal social movement dynamics,
ideological differences, and substantive, symbolic, and affective attributes
11. I use the term "social movement" to include individuals and organizations who functioned as
policy insiders as well as outsiders. As John D. Skrentny has noted, while "[s]cholars almost always
assume social movements are discrete entities that exist outside of government," in the late 1960s and
early 1970s "formal members of social-movement organizations held positions of power" in
government and "played crucial roles in formulating and pushing new rights." JOHN D. SKRENTNY,
THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 5 (2002).
12. 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
13. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). For an argument that larger
and more diffuse groups have a more difficult time than discrete and insular minorities prevailing in the
political process, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 742
(2002) ("[L]ike the Holy Roman Empire-which was neither holy, Roman, nor an empire-women are
neither discrete, insular, nor a minority.").
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associated with the ERA and its alternatives shaped advocates' constitu-
tional choices. The final sections describe constitutional roads not taken,
exploring the costs and benefits involved in unification around a dual con-
stitutional strategy that foreclosed more expansive modes of change.
A. "We May Escape from Our Dilemma ": Pauli Murray and the
Resurrection of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1962-63
Since the early 1920s, American feminism had been divided, often
sharply, into two opposing camps. One, composed primarily of Alice
Paul's National Woman's Party (NWP) and some professional women's
groups, insisted that an ERA eliminating all legal distinctions between men
and women was necessary to secure women's equal status in American
society. 4 Special laws for women, these equalitarians believed, served to
"protect" them not from dangerous working conditions so much as from
advancement in traditionally male-dominated occupations. The other fac-
tion, exemplified at various points by Florence Kelley, Eleanor Roosevelt,
Mary Anderson, and Esther Peterson, fought hard for protective labor leg-
islation-minimum wage, maximum hours, and weightlifting regula-
tions-for women at a time when substantive due process doctrines
precluded the enactment of similar laws for male laborers.'5 The protec-
tionists balked at any formal equality measure that might undermine those
gains, which they believed were essential to the well-being of working
women. Between 1923 and the late 1950s, the NWP's small but deter-
mined cadres persistently pressed the ERA in Congress, without much suc-
cess. Allies of the protectionists were equally determined, often attaching
riders and amendments to exempt protective labor laws from coverage and
effectively negate the amendment's purpose. 16
When the President's Commission on the Status of Women (PCSW) 7
convened in late 1961, many participants were eager to develop an
14. For more on the NWP, see generally SUSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS (1981); NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING
OF MODERN FEMINISM (1987); CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL SUFFRAGE To EQUAL
RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY, 1910-1928 (1986); LEILA J. RuPP &
VERTA TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1945
TO THE 196oS (1987); Nancy F. Cott, Feminist Politics in the 1920s: The National Woman's Party, 71
J. AM. HIST. 43 (1984).
15. For more on the debates over protective labor legislation, see VIVIEN HART, BOUND BY OUR
CONSTITUTION: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND THE MINIMUM WAGE (1994); Joan G. Zimmerman, The
Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women's Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 1905-1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188 (1991).
16. See, e.g., CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES,
1945-1968, at 30-38 (1988) (discussing Sen. Carl Hayden's amendment, which read: "The provisions
in this article shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions conferred by law upon
persons of the female sex.").
17. Cynthia Harrison has provided the most comprehensive treatment of the PCSW's work. See
[Vol. 92:755
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alternative legal strategy that could circumvent the divisive debate over the
ERA. In 1962, the PCSW's Committee on Civil and Political Rights
(CCPR) asked Pauli Murray, an attorney and civil rights expert, to evaluate
the strategies available to those concerned with women's legal position in
American society. Murray, then a fifty-one-year-old doctoral student at
Yale Law School, was a veteran of struggles for racial equality. After un-
successfully challenging the color barrier at the University of North
Carolina's graduate school in 1938," Murray had attended Howard
University Law School, where she helped lead World War II-era sit-ins in
segregated Washington, D.C. restaurants and advocated a direct challenge
to separate-but-equal educational institutions in a research paper later used
by the Brown v. Board of Education9 litigation team.2" Murray was also no
stranger to battles for sex equity. In 1944, about to graduate first in her law
school class, she was denied on the basis of sex the Harvard Law School
fellowship traditionally awarded to top Howard graduates. Deeply hurt by
the cavalier attitudes of many of her male Howard colleagues toward her
plight,2 Murray pledged to dedicate herself to vanquishing "Jane Crow" as
well as "Jim Crow.
22
Murray's PCSW memorandum recommended a renewed effort to liti-
gate women's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and transformed
feminist constitutional horizons in a manner that still reverberates today.23
After conducting extensive legal research, Murray proposed a litigation
strategy modeled on the civil rights movement's successful transformation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's judicial meaning.24 She articulated a
18. For more on Murray's challenge to the University of North Carolina's exclusionary policy,
see PAULI MURRAY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER, PRIEST AND
POET 108-12, 115-29 (1987); Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Admitting Pauli Murray, 14 J. WOMEN'S
HIST. 62 (2002). For an excellent introduction to Murray's significance as a historical figure, see
Dialogue: Pauli Murray's Notable Connections, 14 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 54 (2002).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Murray recounts in her autobiography that then-Howard law professor Spottswood Robinson
bet her ten dollars in 1944 that Plessy would not be overruled for at least twenty-five years. Many years
later, she collected on the bet, and Robinson surprised her by relating how he and his NAACP
colleagues had relied on her law school work in composing their briefs for Brown. MURRAY, supra note
18, at 221-22.
21. Id. at 240 ("The fact that Harvard's rejection was a source of mild amusement rather than
outrage to many of my male colleagues who were ardent civil rights advocates made it all the more
bitter to swallow."). For more on Murray's attempt to gain admission to Harvard Law School, see
REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 79 (J. Clay Smith, Jr., ed., 1998)
(reprinting Murray's letter to the Harvard Corporation).
22. MURRAY, supra note 18, at 244.
23. Pauli Murray, A Proposal To Reexamine the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to
State Laws and Practices Which Discriminate on the Basis of Sex Per Se 10 (Dec. 1, 1962) (PCSW
Papers, Doc. 11-20, Box 8, Folder 62, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) [hereinafter Murray, Proposal To Reexamine].
24. Id. at 8-9; PCSW, CCPR, Report of Meeting Held August 24, 1962, at 3 (Oct. 15, 1962)
(PCSW Papers, Doc. A-3, Box 8, Folder 61, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University) [hereinafter Report of Meeting Held August 24, 1962] ("Miss Pauli
2004]
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standard of "heightened reasonableness" designed to enable courts to iden-
tify invidiously discriminatory laws that disadvantaged and demeaned
women, while preserving the truly protective laws to which Esther
Peterson and other labor activists were committed. Drawing heavily on an
analogy between race and sex discrimination,25 Murray sought to emulate
the success of organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in win-
ning rights through organized litigation.26
Murray believed that the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment strat-
egy were manifold. First, the strategy provided a flexible, case-by-case ap-
proach that held the promise of eliminating pernicious discriminations
against women, such as exclusion from jury service, without disrupting
protections important to labor advocates. As such, this approach was stra-
tegically appealing because it provided a new agenda behind which femi-
nists of various stripes could unite-an alternative to the bitter and
counterproductive disputes that had stymied effective political action in the
past. Finally, Murray realized that the Fourteenth Amendment strategy
concretely linked the civil rights and women's rights movements at a time
when the primary efforts toward constitutional change for women involved
racist appeals to Southern segregationist legislators whom the NWP impor-
tuned for support in passing the ERA.27
Quickly perceiving the danger of continued polarization, Murray quite
self-consciously viewed her role as a mediator between the protectionist
and equalitarian factions. As she wrote to U.S. Representative Edith Green,
also a PCSW member, "The controversy over the ERA seemed to force
people who espoused the same goals into rigid positions and dissipated
energies which might have gone toward a development of standards for the
concept of equal status."28 Murray herself was not opposed to the substance
of the ERA; rather, she believed that insufficient support among women's
Murray... pointed out that court action on the 14th Amendment had been more effective than
legislative efforts in the struggle for Negro rights.").
25. For more on the origins and uses of race-sex analogies, see Serena Mayeri, Note, "'A
Common Fate of Discrimination ": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110
YALE L.J. 1045 (2001); see also ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 228-33, 241-89 (2001);
SKRENTNY, supra note 11, at 86-87, 111-19, 130-41. Murray's memorandum is also discussed in
HARRISON, supra note 16, at 126-30; SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN
THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 62-63 (1998); LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE
LADIES 189-93 (1998); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra, at 229-32; JUDITH PATERSON, BE SOMEBODY: A
BIOGRAPHY OF MARGUERITE RAWALT 138 (1986); Becker, supra note 7, at 222-31; Rosalind
Rosenberg, Pauli Murray and the Killing of Jane Crow, in FORGOTTEN HEROES 279 (Susan Ware ed.,
1998).
26. Murray, Proposal to Reexamine, supra note 23, at 21.
27. See infra Part I.B. 1.
28. Letter from Pauli Murray to Rep. Edith Green (D-OR) (Jan. 24, 1963) (Pauli Murray Papers,




groups for a new amendment precluded its success but did not bar a con-
structive attempt at constitutional change through judicial reinterpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 When pressed, she reassured laborites that
a Fourteenth Amendment approach would shield protective labor legisla-
tion from challenge.3" In an internal memorandum to members of the
CCPR, she articulated the strategy behind her proposed draft of the final
committee report:
[I]t seeks to approve the underlying principle of the Equal Rights
Amendment... without taking any position on that Amendment or
referring to it by name. If we could build up the Fourteenth
Amendment in this way without sacrificing the principle of the ER
Amendment, we may escape from our dilemma.3
Reaction to Murray's memorandum was mixed. At one end of the
spectrum, some perceived Murray's proposal as too radical: Harvard Law
School Dean Erwin Griswold, for instance, praised her "excellent
memorandum," but confessed that he found himself "rather luke warm"
about her equation of race and sex discrimination.32 "Somehow or other, it
has always seemed to me that there are differences in sex, and that these
differences may, in appropriate cases, be the basis of classification for legal
purposes," he wrote.33 The National Council of Jewish Women similarly
feared that the logical conclusion of the race-sex analogy was the removal
of all sex-based distinctions from the law.34 The AFL-CIO, while
29. Murray recalled later that her memo was "careful not to disclaim the ultimate need for an
equal rights amendment. It had seemed to me that given the absence of broad public support for the
ERA at the time, the Fourteenth Amendment approach was a practical intermediate step. If successful,
it might achieve on a case-by-case basis the same objectives as ERA supporters envisioned, but if the
courts failed to respond favorably, then the case for the ERA was unassailable." MURRAY, supra note
18, at 351-52. See also Letter from Skipper (Caroline Ware) to Pixie (Pauli Murray) (Oct. 12, 1962)
(Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 878, on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University) (advising Murray to avoid taking a stand on the amendment since "[tihe
moment you do... you invite opposition from a quarter which will support you if you keep strictly
silent on the 'equal rights' issue").
30. See, e.g., Letter from Pauli Murray to Katherine P. Ellickson (Oct. 13, 1962) (Pauli Murray
Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 876, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) ("First, let me say that my position on labor legislation protective in nature is that it should
not be disturbed.").
31. Memorandum from Pauli Murray to Edith Green, Frank Sander, Harriet Pilpel, Marguerite
Rawalt, Mary Eastwood, Katherine Ellickson, and Mrs. Hilton, Re: Fourteenth Amendment-Equal
Rights Amendment Statement (Mar. 12, 1963) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 59,
on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
32. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Pauli Murray (Jan. 31, 1963) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 49, Folder 878, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
33. Id.
34. See Statement of Mrs. Samuel Brown, National Council of Jewish Women, before the CCPR
of the PCSW 4 (Mar. 8, 1963) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49, Folder 883, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University). "As a philosophical and sociaological
[sic] concept it may have some validity," Brown said of the race-sex parallel, but she worried that "the
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preferring the Fourteenth Amendment litigation approach to the ERA, de-
clined fully to endorse the Murray memo. The labor union feared
"sweeping judicial pronouncements that employers might seize upon to
turn against protective labor legislation"3 5 and called for legislation that
would address private discrimination in employment rather than curb pub-
lic sex-differentiating practices.36
A range of individuals and groups supported the Fourteenth
Amendment approach both because it offered a chance of substantive suc-
cess and because it might undercut the ERA. The ACLU, a longtime oppo-
nent of the ERA,37 enthusiastically embraced the Murray proposal as a
vindication of its stance.38 ACLU Equality Committee Chair and longtime
women's rights advocate Dorothy Kenyon wrote to the PCSW: "Miss
Murray's analysis heartens us in our belief that the equality clause of the
XIV Amendment looks like the best constitutional instrument at hand for
the reflection of the social changes involved in the changing status of
women."39 Paul Freund, a protrgd of Louis Brandeis and professor at
Harvard Law School who had testified against the ERA before Congress in
the 1940s, also welcomed Murray's proposal, noting that it allowed "the
questions involved.., to be approached on a particularistic and flexible
basis. "40
Supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment approach occasionally
pointed to the activist constitutional climate of the Warren Court era as a
reason for optimism about judicial reinterpretation of existing provisions.
Murray's proposal itself emphasized that courts often responded to shifts in
community values and noted that the Fourteenth Amendment "had been
invoked successfully in those instances where the shocking injustice of a
situation cut through the subjectivities of the judges."'" Senator Carl
attempt to equate the two kinds of discrimination carries with it the implication that differential legal
treatment for women is not acceptable." Id.
35. Statement of the AFL-CIO on Methods of Removing Legal Discrimination Against Women,
Submitted to CCPR of the PCSW 4-5 (Mar. 13, 1963) (PCSW Papers, B-26, Box 9, Folder 63, on file
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Statement of the
AFL-CIO].
36. Id. at 6.
37. On the ACLU's opposition to the ERA prior to 1970, see HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 59,
73; see also infra Part I.D.3.
38. Indeed, as an alternative to the ERA, the ACLU had previously advocated a three-pronged
strategy to fight invidious discrimination against women: litigation, legislation at the state and federal
levels, and efforts to combat private discrimination. See, e.g., Memorandum from Pat Malin to ACLU
Equality Committee, Re: Removing Discrimination Against Women (Nov. 17, 1959) (ACLU Records,
Box 1142, Folder 23, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
39. Memorandum from Dorothy Kenyon 4 (Mar. 28, 1963) (PCSW Papers, B-26, Box 9, Folder
63, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
40. Letter from Paul A. Freund to Esther Peterson (Mar. 11, 1963) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-
M257, Cartnon 1, Folder 58, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
41. Murray, Proposal to Reexamine, supra note 23, at 30.
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Hayden, a key congressional ally of the protectionist partisans, noted that
"court decisions.., have demonstrated the adaptability of constitutional
standards to meet new problems and changing conditions. 42 Skeptics
evaluated the potential for judicial reinterpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment more pessimistically. Alice G. Andrews, a friend of Murray's,
did not believe in asking the courts "to take up what is basically a legisla-
tive function" unless "there is an extreme case of discrimination raised by
an individual and, as in the struggle for negro [sic] rights, it can be
[attached to] a broad social problem in this country. '43 In general, Andrews
did not find cases of discrimination against women to be "necessarily that
extreme."44
For Murray and some of her colleagues on the CCPR, the Fourteenth
Amendment approach was not an end run around the ERA's ultimate ob-
jective but an alternative means to a similar end. Mary Eastwood, a
Department of Justice (DOJ) attorney who served as the committee's tech-
nical secretary, explained that the statement issued by the committee was
''essentially a compromise" designed to "render an amendment
unnecessary. '45 She emphasized that the agreed-upon language was not
intended "to suggest that women's organization[s] and individuals who are
seeking passage of the equal rights amendment should cease their ef-
forts. 46 Indeed, several proposed versions of the committee statement
strongly implied that an amendment might be appropriate if litigation
proved unavailing.47
In addition to mediating the conflict between protectionists and ERA
proponents, the Fourteenth Amendment strategy held the promise of estab-
lishing stronger ties between women's rights advocacy and the existing
civil rights agenda, as well as building on the past successes of the civil
rights movement. Most obviously, the race-sex analogy on which Murray
based her argument connected these causes in a substantively meaningful
way. 48 Furthermore, Murray's litigation strategy called for increased ties to
civil rights and civil liberties groups such as the NAACP and the ACLU, as
42. Statement by Sen. Carl Hayden, Equality of Rights for Men and Women (Oct. 1963),
microformed on National Woman's Party Papers 1913-1974 [hereinafter NWP Papers], Misc 959, Reel
108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
43. Letter from Alice G. Andrews to Pauli Murray (Nov. 13, 1962) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 49, Folder 876, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
44. Id.
45. Letter from Mary Eastwood to Judge Florence K. Murray (1963) (Mary Eastwood Papers,
83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 58, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Letter from Katherine P. Ellickson, PCSW Executive Secretary, CCPR, to Norbert
Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, DOJ (Apr. 18, 1963) (Esther Peterson Papers, Box 44, Folder 891,
on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (proposed statements
attached).
48. Mayeri, supra note 25, at 1055-72.
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well as the DOJ.49 Litigation appealed to Murray as a tactic because, as she
pointed out, thus far "court action on the 14th Amendment" had been
"more effective than legislative efforts in the struggle for Negro rights."5°
Moreover, in the heyday of the Warren Court, whose pioneering reinterpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment in race cases had already assumed
legendary proportions, the possibilities for achieving change through the
courts seemed stronger than ever. Even the skeptical AFL-CIO opined that,
if women's groups were to pursue a litigation-based strategy, "[t]he present
composition of the Supreme Court itself would not appear to be an
unfavorable factor."
51
Murray had managed to win over much of the anti-ERA women's
rights contingent with her Fourteenth Amendment approach, but initially
she made no headway in convincing amendment partisans. Marguerite
Rawalt, former president of the Federal Bar Association and the National
Federation of Business and Professional Women (BPW), and the only pro-
ERA member of the CCPR, fought indefatigably to preserve within the
commission's final statement the possibility of seeking a new amendment
at some future time.52 Meanwhile, NWP members were adamant that the
Fourteenth Amendment litigation strategy was nothing more than a delib-
erate attempt to undermine the ERA by pursuing what was, purely and
simply, a lost cause. That longtime ERA opponent and Women's Bureau
official Esther Peterson had given the proposal her blessing was itself
enough to prejudice the NWP against it. 3 In its public statements, the
NWP emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment path was "wishful
thinking"--utterly hopeless, impractical, and counterproductive.54
Privately, at least one NWP member even suspected Murray of spear-
heading an NAACP conspiracy to hijack the women's rights movement.55
Murray's "preoccupation," Miriam Holden posited, "is with the Negro
problem, and her primary purpose seems largely to be an attempt to hitch
that wagon to our Equal Rights Amendment star."56 Such a linkage, Holden
worried, would jeopardize the political viability of an ERA and "spell
49. Murray, Proposal to Reexamine, supra note 23, at 37; see also Pauli Murray, Draft
Memorandum 5 (Aug. 24, 1962) (PCSW Papers, B-26, Box 8, Folder 61, on file with the Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
50. Report of Meeting Held August 24, 1962, supra note 24.
51. Statement of the AFL-CIO, supra note 35, at 5.
52. HARRISON, supra note 16, at 132-34; PATERSON, supra note 25, at 143.
53. See, e.g., Letter from Emma Guffey Miller, Chairman, NWP, to Jane Grant (Nov. 22, 1963),
microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.) ("Esther Peterson
loaded the commission against equality.").
54. See, e.g., Miriam Y. Holden, Argument in Favor of the Equal Rights Amendment, Made at
the Request of the National Woman's Party (Mar. 23, 1963) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 49,
Folder 883, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
55. 1 use similar language to discuss Holden's perspective in Mayeri, supra note 25, at 1062.
56. Letter from Miriam Holden to Anita Pollitzer (Feb. 16, 1963), microformed on NWP Papers,
Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
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disaster for our hopes," since "[t]he Southern states are sure to look with
disfavor on any Constitutional legislation that is linked with the Negro
problem."57 Remarkably, Holden suggested that the civil rights move-
ment-which by 1963 had enjoyed success that the NWP could only dream
of-was attempting to co-opt the ERA for its own purposes; she accused
the NAACP of conspiring to "infiltrate" the women's movement and
"make use of it as a springboard for their own propaganda."58
In the year of the landmark March on Washington for civil rights,
some in the NWP were marching to the beat of the segregationist drum-
mer.59 For them, equal rights for women-and by extension, the ERA-
would only be sullied by an association with Black civil rights. In this con-
text, the Fourteenth Amendment approach, based as it was on an analogy
between race and sex discrimination, stood not only for a reluctance to sac-
rifice protective labor laws at the altar of formal equality, but also for the
embrace of civil rights victories won and sought by African Americans.
Ironically, it would take the passage of Title VII's sex discrimination pro-
hibition-introduced by a sworn enemy of civil rights-to begin to extri-
cate the ERA and its equalitarian proponents from their entanglement with
racial segregationists.
B. Title VII's Sex Amendment and the Creation of a New
Civil Rights Constituency, 1963-65
The 1964 passage of the Civil Rights Act, complete with Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination in employment, had three important and
lasting effects upon legal feminists' constitutional horizons. 6' First, despite
its origins in an unholy alliance between feminists and segregationists,
Title VII's sex amendment marked the beginning of the end of overt race-
baiting as an instrument of women's rights advocacy. Second, by creating
an expectation of government intervention in private discrimination but no
concomitant will to enforce the sex provision, Title VII galvanized femi-
nists to fight for a cause they could all agree upon. Third, though it would
take several years for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to establish a firm stance on protective labor legislation, Title VII
eventually triggered the demise of sex-specific protectionism. With the
primary source of anti-ERA sentiment removed, feminists could unite be-
hind a dual Fourteenth Amendment-ERA strategy by the end of the decade.
In sum, although Title VII produced few immediate results for victims of
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Nina Horton Avery, Report to the Membership of the NWP on President Kennedy's
Conference at the White House on July 9, 1963, with Group of Leaders of Women's Organizations,
Concerning President's Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963 (July 15, 1963), microformed on NWP
Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
60. This section focuses primarily on the first two effects, though the third is equally important.
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sex discrimination in employment, its passage proved highly significant in
consolidating legal feminism as a force to be reckoned with and altering
the terms of advocates' constitutional choices.
1. Protecting the "White Christian Woman of United States Origin"
In a way, the introduction of the sex amendment to Title VII marked
the culmination of an odd courtship between Southern segregationist poli-
ticians and NWP feminists. For years, one of the NWP's primary legisla-
tive strategies had been to entice Southern congressmembers to introduce
and support amendments to civil rights bills establishing protections for
(white) women.6' From the perspective of Southern segregationists, such
proposals simultaneously allowed for the demonstration of chivalrous re-
gard for white womanhood and the prospect of defeating civil rights bills
with the proverbial "killer amendment." In this respect, the introduction of
Title VII's sex amendment by an avowed segregationist was not the pecu-
liar aberration of some depictions.62 In February 1964, encouraged by
NWP members who were, at best, ambivalent about civil rights for African
Americans,63 Rep. Howard W. "Judge" Smith of Virginia proposed the ad-
dition of sex to the prohibited categories of discrimination and was greeted
by the ribald and indulgent laughter of many colleagues.'
Rep. Emanuel Celler of New York, a primary sponsor of the Civil
Rights Act and a longtime ERA opponent, immediately rose in opposition
to Smith's proposed amendment. Celler listed a parade of horribles-
compulsory military service, the decline of traditional family relationships,
and the invalidation of rape laws and protective labor legislation-that he
feared would follow from the adoption of legal sex equality. 65 Moreover,
Celler contended, even if women did experience some discrimination in
61. Rupp and Taylor attribute the NWP's alliances with segregationists to the racial insensitivity
of many of its members, to the NWP's perception that white women's interests were antagonistic to
those of African Americans, and to the NWP's generally opportunistic approach to ERA advocacy.
Rupp & TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 160-62.
62. For more on subsequent misrepresentations of the Title VII debate, see Jo Freeman, How
"Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163
(1991); see also Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex
Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HiST. 37 (1983).
63. See, e.g., Letter from B. Franklin, NWP, to Rep. Howard W. "Judge" Smith (D-VA) (Dec.
10, 1963), microformedon NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
Last evening my house guest.., and I were discussing the terrors inherent in the Civil Rights
Act .... This morning we decided to telephone your office, and present a thought which may
help change the Bill .... Our idea is to add the word 'sex' .... This single word 'sex' would
divert some of the high pressure which is being used to force this Bill through without proper
attention to all of the effects of it. If any Bill is passed on the subject of Civil Rights, a great
agitation is going to take place among the white women of America unless the word 'sex' is
included.
Id.
64. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).
65. Id. (statement of Rep. Celler).
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employment, their progress toward equality was rapid compared to that of
Negroes.66 Celler could comfortably oppose the sex amendment based both
on his firm commitment to ending racial discrimination and on his stolid
opposition to formal legal equality for women.
Rep. Martha Griffiths of Michigan, a longtime advocate of women's
rights, issued a lengthy rebuttal in which she appealed to her colleagues not
to leave white women unprotected from employment discrimination. "I rise
in support of the amendment," announced Griffiths, "because I feel as a
white woman when this bill has passed ... that white women will be last at
the hiring gate."67 Despite her recognition at other points in the debate that
Black women, too, were at risk without a sex amendment, Griffiths made a
politic appeal to the prejudices of Southern congressmen. She posed sev-
eral hypotheticals in an attempt to force Celler to admit that Title VII,
without a sex amendment, would cover Black women but not white
women. "[Y]ou are going to try to take colored men and colored women
and give them equal employment rights, and down at the bottom of the list
is going to be a white woman with no rights at all," she complained.68
Eager to undermine the race discrimination provisions of Title VII,
Southern legislators chimed in to support Griffiths. One legislator warned
that without the amendment, "the white women of this country would be
drastically discriminated against in favor of a Negro woman."69 Much of
the legislators' rhetoric echoed a 1963 NWP resolution, which had warned
that "the Civil Rights Bill would not even give protection against
discrimination because of 'race, color, religion or national origins,' to a
White Woman, a Woman of the Christian Religion, or a Woman of United
States Origin."7 °
Fearful that the alliance between feminists and Southerners would
derail the entire civil rights bill, Rep. Edith Green, author of the Equal Pay
Act, PCSW member, and longtime supporter of women's progress, pro-
fessed her opposition to the amendment. Sardonically praising her
Southern colleagues for their belated conversion to the women's rights
cause, she acknowledged that discrimination against women in employ-
ment was an important and serious problem. But at the risk of being la-
beled an "uncle Tom" or "aunt Jane," as she put it, Green declared, "I do
not believe this is the time or place for this amendment .... For every
66. Id. at 2578.
67. Id. (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
68. Id. at 2579. Griffiths continued: "[W]hen the colored woman shows up and she is qualified,
she is going to have an open entr&e into any particular field .... [W]hite men have done this
before... [Y]our greatgrandfathers [sic] were willing as prisoners of their own prejudice to permit ex-
slaves to vote, but not their own white wives." Id. at 2579-80.
69. Id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Andrews); see also id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Rivers).
70. NWP Resolution (adopted Dec. 16, 1963), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108
(Microfilming Corp. of Am.) (emphasis in original), quoted in Brauer, supra note 62, at 43.
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discrimination that has been made against a woman in this country there
has been 10 times as much discrimination against the Negro of this
country.' Understandably afraid to gamble on what was clearly intended
by segregationists to be a killer amendment, Green could not join her fe-
male colleagues in their unanimous support of the sex provision.72
By contrast, Southern segregationist solicitude for the "White,
Christian Woman of United States Origin" reflected the sentiments of
many in the NWP, who had declared publicly that the Civil Rights Act
sans sex amendment would subject such women to increasingly onerous
discrimination. 73 Furthermore, in correspondence with Southern legislators,
some NWP officials had not only pleaded for the inclusion of white
women in the civil rights bill, but had expressed their opposition to and
even disgust at the prospect of civil rights for African Americans. A month
before Judge Smith's introduction of the sex amendment, Nina Horton
Avery, chair of the Virginia Committee of the NWP, sent a letter to her
congressman declaring that the civil rights bill "in addition to extending the
authority of the Executive Branch of our Government into preactically [sic]
every facet of our lives... regulate[s] white women of Christian relition
[sic] to oblivion from every angle."74 She acknowledged the inevitability of
civil rights legislation in some form, but expressed her gratitude to "the
Members of Congress ... who will use their brains and energies to prevent
a mongrel race in the United States and who will fight for the rights of
white citizens in order that discriminations against them may be stopped."75
Many NWP documents that did not express outright opposition to the
civil rights bill nevertheless emphasized the particular dangers it posed to
the employment aspirations of white native-born Christian women. An of-
ficial NWP statement posited that, without the sex amendment, the civil
rights bill would give "women of religious and racial minorities ... special
government protection denied to... the American-born white Protestant
woman."76 Even Emma Guffey Miller, a member of the Democratic
National Committee and the NWP's national chair, argued for the sex
71. 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green). Green continued: "As much as I
hope the day will come when discrimination will be ended against women... [this amendment] may
later.., be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some of the very people who today support
it." Id.
72. In Mayeri, supra note 25, at 1064-65, I use language similar to that of the prior three
paragraphs above in discussing the responses of Celler, Griffith, and Green to Smith's proposed
amendment.
73. NWP Resolution, supra note 70.
74. Letter from Nina Horton Avery to Rep. J. Vaughan Gary (D-VA) (Jan. 8, 1964), microformed
on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
75. Id.
76. NWP, The Importance and Necessity of the Provisions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Bill
which Prevents Discrimination in Employment Against Women Workers (Mar. 6, 1964), microformed
on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
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amendment's urgency in terms of protecting white native-born Christian
women from racial and religious discrimination."
Significantly, the NWP's ERA advocacy was also bound up in this
antagonistic view of the Civil Rights Act. Some NWP members hoped that
an ERA would ensure that any legislation creating rights for racial and re-
ligious minority groups extended these rights to white Christian women. In
early 1964, then, many NWP members saw the ERA as a corrective, rather
than a complement, to the Civil Rights Act. Ultimately, passage of the sex
amendment would alleviate those racialist concerns and pave the way for a
more cooperative relationship between legal feminists and the civil rights
movement.
2. "Today It Is the Negro Women Who Will Win for All of Us Equal
Rights ": Title VII's Partial Triumph and the Retreat from Feminist
Racialism
NWP members were by no means unanimous in their ambivalence
about civil rights legislation for African Americans. Some viewed the civil
rights bill and the Black movement generally as a valuable source of mo-
mentum that women's rights advocates should capitalize on rather than
struggle against.78 Alma Lutz, a historian of the women's suffrage move-
ment, NWP member, and secretary of the Massachusetts Committee for the
ERA, wrote to her colleagues in early 1964, "While the country is thinking
in terms of complete citizenship for the Negro, it is important that there be
no further delay in extending full citizenship to women through the
adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment."79 NWP member Meta Heller
was more explicit in her support for Black civil rights, writing to Emma
Guffey Miller that while she "would be happy to serve" on the NWP com-
mittee forming to safeguard women's interests in the Senate debate over
the Civil Rights Act, she felt that the bill was "terribly important."8 Heller
declared her belief that "today it is the negro [sic] women who will win for
all of us equal rights. I only wish all women's organizations would get
behind the civil rights movement, forgetting their prejudices for their own
advancement."'"
77. See, e.g., Letter from Emma Guffey Miller to Rep. Martha Griffiths (D-M1) (Jan. 20, 1964),
microformedon NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
78. Even some feminists who initially expressed ambivalence about the struggle for racial justice
appreciated the genius of the civil rights movement and harangued their white female cohort for their
lack of similar militancy. Marguerite Rawalt, for instance, wrote to a fellow lawyer in 1956 that "[i]f
women had the sand that some of our minority... groups have ... we would have [the ERA] enacted
in short time." PATERSON, supra note 25, at 115.
79. Letter from Alma Lutz to Colleagues (Jan. 21, 1964), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc
959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
80. Letter from Meta Heller to Emma Guffey Miller (Feb. 26, 1964), microformed on NWP
Papers, Misc 959, Reel 108 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
81. Id.
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Pauli Murray cherished the same wish. The prevailing portrayal of the
sex amendment as a favor to white women and a blow to Black civil rights
impelled Murray to reframe the provision as centrally concerned with the
rights of African-American women.82 As she wrote to Representative
Griffiths in April 1964, "Having somewhat more than a speaking
acquaintance with both Jim Crow and Jane Crow, it seems to be my lot to
make the connection."83 When the sex amendment was in danger of failing
in the Senate, Murray wrote a memorandum that was circulated among
Senators and eventually reviewed by the White House, arguing that includ-
ing sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination was the only way to extend
the benefits of Title VII to the group that most needed them: Black
women. She discredited Griffiths's suggestion that white women would be
"last at the hiring gate" without a sex amendment:
What is more likely to happen... [is that] in accordance with the
prevailing patterns of employment both Negro and white women
will share a common fate of discrimination, since it is exceedingly
difficult for a Negro woman to determine whether or not she is
being discriminated against because of race or sex. 4
In fact, Murray urged, "A strong argument can be made for the proposition
that Title VII without the 'sex' amendment would benefit Negro males
primarily and thus offer genuine equality of opportunity to only ha/f of the
potential Negro work force."85
Although the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not banish
all racialist arguments from the NWP's rhetorical arsenal,86 the inclusion of
sex discrimination alongside race discrimination in Title VII ironically
prompted a shift away from the segregationist alliance that had shaped the
Party's political sympathies before 1964-and that had helped to pass the
sex amendment itself. Now that the NWP had won protection against sex
discrimination, at least nominally, it was invested in the survival of the
82. For other discussions of Murray's role in the Title VII debate, see HARRISON, supra note 16,
at 180-81; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 25, at 245-46; MURRAY, supra note 18, at 354-58; Becker,
supra note 7, at 233-35; Mayeri, supra note 25, at 1063-67.
83. Letter from Pauli Murray to Rep. Martha Griffiths (D-MI) (Apr. 24, 1964) (Mary Eastwood
Papers, 83-M257, Carton I, Folder 7, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
84. Pauli Murray, Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title VII
(Equal Employment Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Sex 20 (Apr.
14, 1964) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 85, Folder 1485, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
85. Id. at 20-21.
86. See, e.g., Letter from Laura Roberts to Sen. Sam Ervin and Sen. Everett Jordan (Sept. 15,
1965), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 109 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.) ("I see that all
branches of the Federal Government... are giving preferential treatment to the Negro over our own
daughters, especially in the fields of employment and education. It is unthinkable that we should stand
idly by while such injustice is taking place with ever increasing frequency.").
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civil rights statute and in feminist mobilization behind enforcement of the
sex discrimination prohibition the Party had worked so hard to win.
Though the NWP would never deviate from its devotion to achieving
an ERA at all costs, Party documents reflect a perceptible shift in 1964 and
after in attitudes toward the Black civil rights movement and its relation-
ship to feminism. To be sure, the new attitude was perhaps no less oppor-
tunistic than the old.87 Nevertheless, Title VII helped to bring about a
significant retreat from the explicitly racialist feminism the NWP had pre-
viously sponsored. The NWP's official tone first began to reflect the Alma
Lutzes and Meta Hellers of the group during the Senate debate over Title
VII, as it became clear that the viability of the sex discrimination provision
depended directly upon the survival of the civil rights bill. In an August
1964 statement arguing for the retention of the sex amendment, the NWP
took a somewhat more positive stance on African-American civil rights.
While retaining language about white women's particular disadvantages,
the statement also contained a section arguing that "Negro women suffer
more discrimination than Negro men."88 During an attempt to repeal Title
VII in 1965, Alma Lutz reminded her colleagues that "Title VII... is
particularly important to Negro women who, according to Government
reports, suffer more from job discrimination than Negro men."89
The danger of repeal passed fairly quickly, but the EEOC's enforce-
ment priorities proved a more enduring threat to Title VII's impact on sex
discrimination in employment. The EEOC's stated policy of giving lesser
priority to sex discrimination claims than to race discrimination complaints
soon alerted feminists to the need for political mobilization.9" Though the
NWP and the protectionists disagreed about Title VII's impact on protec-
tive labor legislation, they could unite to press for procedures that would
ensure the vindication of women's right to be free from discriminatory hir-
ing, wage, promotion, and firing practices.
87. An unsigned, handwritten letter partially reproduced in the NWP collection recounts the
group's changing disposition with respect to Title VII:
Before the C R bill was passed the National W.P. made a study of its demands and reached
the conclusion that the reports required and the liability of suits at law, would impose so large
a demand on people ... [that] the N.W. Party was active in working against the passage of
the Civil Rights bill. However, when it became evident that the bill would pass, the N.W.P.
worked devotedly to get coverage for the white, Christian, American born woman-the same
protection as the colored woman, non Christian, foreign bom woman was to enjoy.
Unsigned letter to "Gentlemen" 1-2 (Feb. 1965), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 109
(Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
88. NWP Research Committee, Civil Rights for Women 6 (Aug. 1964), microformed on NWP
Papers, Misc 959, Reel 109 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
89. Letter from Alma Lutz to Colleagues (Sept. 25, 1965), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc
959, Reel 109 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
90. For more on the EEOC's failure to enforce the sex discrimination provision of Title VII, see
Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 76-79 (1975); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 205-32 (1990);
HARRISON, supra note 16, at 192-206; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 25, at 246-47.
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Title VII also provided an unprecedented link between struggles for
racial justice and sex equality. A crucial document articulating the impor-
tance of eradicating sex discrimination in employment and other fields was
the seminal 1965 article "Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"'" the result of nearly two years
of collaborative effort between Pauli Murray and DOJ attorney Mary
Eastwood, who had served together on the PCSW's CCPR. "Jane Crow
and the Law," as its title suggested, argued for a strong moral and legal
commitment to the elimination of sex discrimination based upon an anal-
ogy to race. Echoing Murray's earlier emphasis on the particular needs of
Black women, the article brought together arguments against sex discrimi-
nation in private employment, to be combated under Title VII, and in pub-
lic laws and practices, to be attacked through litigation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The race-sex analogy provided a framework justi-
fying both endeavors and connecting them analytically, symbolically, and
strategically.92
Murray pursued this analogy in a much-publicized speech to the
National Council of Women in October 1965, in which she excoriated the
EEOC's failure to enforce Title VI's anti-sex-discrimination provision and
urged women to take concerted action on their own behalf. Murray told her
audience that Title VII could prove as significant as the Nineteenth
Amendment in advancing women's legal status, "[b]ut there is reason to
believe that it will not be adequately enforced unless the political power of
women is brought to bear."93 The declaration that captured reporters' atten-
tion came at the end of her speech, when Murray said: "It should not be
necessary to have another March on Washington in order that there be
equal job opportunities for all. But if this necessity should arise, I hope
women will not flinch from the thought."94
Not surprisingly, the NWP was torn over how to react to Murray's
refraining of the legislative and constitutional issues facing feminists. Less
than three years earlier, Murray's use of rhetoric clearly referencing Black
civil rights had provoked Miriam Holden to warn her NWP colleagues of
91. Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965). Hugh Davis Graham calls this article the "intellectual
benchmark" of the "internal women's dialectic" on equality. GRAHAM, supra note 90, at 222.
92. Mayeri, supra note 25, at 1070-72.
93. Pauli Murray, Remarks at the Women and Title VII Conference, National Council of Women
of the United States (Oct. 12, 1965) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 34, on file
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Murray, Remarks at
the Women and Title VII Conference]; see also Letter from Pauli Murray to Marguerite Rawalt 1 (July
21, 1965) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Box 5, Folder 56, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (worrying that "[w]omen's groups are divided and
disorganized, and not fully aware of the implications of the sex provision to make a forward thrust on
their own behalf."); Edith Evans Asbury, Protest Proposed on Women's Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1965, at 32.
94. Murray, Remarks at the Women and Title VII Conference, supra note 93.
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nefarious NAACP plots to co-opt the women's rights movement. But in-
tervening events had utterly transformed Holden's opinion of Murray.95
She wrote to Alice Paul that the newspapers "did not fairly reflect the
intention of [Murray's] speech, which was, I thought, an excellent one."96
After quoting Murray's statement, Holden hastened to add: "I feel
personally that it was extremely important and helpful to our cause that Dr.
Murray took this objective and courageous position."97 Other accounts
were somewhat less enthusiastic, however, lamenting Murray's failure to
publicly embrace the ERA. Another NWP attendee, Dorothy Rogers, wrote
Paul that "[w]hat Pauli Murray said was highly commendable, but she
simply dodged the question of the Equal Rights for the Sexes Bill."98
Murray's civil rights orientation was no longer anathema to NWP members
now that her dedication to the enforcement of Title VII's sex discrimina-
tion prohibition dovetailed with the group's own agenda. Nevertheless,
they could not quite forgive her continued commitment to advancing the
Fourteenth Amendment as a viable constitutional home for feminists' aspi-
rations.
As the NWP's evolving attitude toward Murray illustrates, the pas-
sage of Title VII marked a turning point in feminist constitutional change
advocacy. White supremacy no longer seemed complementary to-or even
fully compatible with-feminist aspirations, now that the fortunes of anti-
racism and anti-sexism would, to some degree, rise and fall together. No
longer were those who favored the Fourteenth Amendment approach and
alliance with the civil rights movement condemned out of hand by ERA
proponents as out-of-touch protectionists or race-obsessed conspirators.
And, as Title VII's logic advanced the norm of equality at the expense of
protection, the ERA slowly began to seem a less ominous threat to those
who cherished the protective laws women's advocates had worked so hard
to achieve.
C. "We Differ Not So Much in Our Objectives as in Our Strategy":
The Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Articulation of the Dual Strategy, 1965-66
By 1965, the NWP, the protectionists, and everyone in between could
agree that pressuring the EEOC to devote resources to combating sex
95. Rawalt, too, had warmed up to Murray's approach. PATERSON, supra note 25, at 155 (noting
that Rawalt's "reservations about Pauli Murray's approach to women's rights had disappeared.").
96. Letter from Miriam C. Holden to Alice Paul 1 (Oct. 16, 1965), microforned on NWP Papers,
Misc 959, Reel 109 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Letter from Dorothy Rogers to Alice Paul (Dec. 2, 1965), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc
959, Reel 109 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
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discrimination was an important objective for all feminists.9 9 NWP mem-
bers had retreated far enough from their antagonism toward Black civil
rights to fight segregationists on the attempted repeal of Title VII, and at
least partially to endorse Murray's prescription for feminist mobilization.
The NWP's actions had also begun to reflect a growing conviction that its
interests might be best served by building upon, rather than undermining,
the Black civil rights cause.
The jury exclusion issue presented just such an opportunity. In 1965,
Gardenia White and several other African-American women and men chal-
lenged their exclusion from the Lowndes County jury that had acquitted
the men accused of killing civil rights activists Viola Liuzzo and Jonathan
Daniels. In Alabama, as in Mississippi and South Carolina, the law ex-
cluded women of all races from jury service, while Black men were kept
off juries through de facto custom.' 0 In White v. Crook,'"' the ACLU and
the DOJ joined forces to challenge both forms of jury exclusion, with at-
torneys Dorothy Kenyon and Pauli Murray drafting the portions of the
plaintiffs' brief addressing the sex discrimination question. Feminists in-
vested a great deal of hope in the White case. For adherents of the
Fourteenth Amendment strategy, the jury exclusion issue held the promise
of an ultimate Supreme Court pronouncement on the applicability of the
Equal Protection Clause to sex discrimination.
The opportunity was tantalizing-a case that starkly and compellingly
linked the civil rights and women's rights struggles, complete with what
Fred Graham of the New York Times called the "all-purpose plaintiff-
Negro women."'0 2 The Supreme Court had been unconvinced of the sex-
discriminatory nature of differential jury service provisions for women and
men in 1961, when Justice Harlan had proclaimed women "the center of
home and family life,"'0 3 but what better case to convince them that such
discrimination was a rights violation than a resonant instance of racial in-
justice? Such a precedent could forever connect the rights of white women
and African Americans in the annals of constitutional jurisprudence, vindi-
cating Murray's greatest hopes.
99. As Hugh Davis Graham recounts, Esther Peterson was disturbed enough about the announced
EEOC policy giving sex discrimination complaints short shrift to write a protest letter to the New York
Times. GRAHAM, supra note 90, at 222.
100. African Americans were excluded, de facto, from jury service in many other Southern states
as well. Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina were the only remaining states that, in the mid-
1960s, still completely excluded women of all races from jury service, but many other states
differentiated between men and women with respect to jury service. Some, for instance, automatically
excluded women from jury rolls unless they specifically requested inclusion, with the practical effect
that many juries through the United States were all male. The most comprehensive discussion of the
jury exclusion issue appears in KERBER, supra note 25, at 124-220; see also HARTMANN, supra note 25,
at 63-66 (discussing White v. Crook).
101. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (per curiam).
102. Fred P. Graham, Rights Case Yields Dividendfor Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1966, at 8E.
103. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
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The window of opportunity would quickly slip away, however. The
election of Richard Nixon in 1968 signaled to many the imminent demise
of a judicial liberalism that celebrated the reinterpretation of constitutional
provisions to encompass new rights and freedoms. While the lower court
ruling in White kept alive hopes of success under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, pragmatic feminist strategists were one step closer to publicly ex-
pressing their conviction that an ERA might indeed be necessary.
1. Feminists' Great White Hope
In February 1966, a three-judge panel" sitting in the Middle District
of Alabama issued a ruling that thrilled feminists." 5 In language reverber-
ant with Warren Court-era expansiveness, the court declared that original
intent was no bar to an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that
embraced principles of sex equality:
The Constitution of the United States must be read as embodying
general principles meant to govern society and the institutions of
government as they evolve through time. It is therefore this Court's
function to apply the Constitution as a living document to the legal
cases and controversies of contemporary society. When such an
application to the facts in this case is made, the conclusion is
inescapable that the complete exclusion of women from jury
service in Alabama is arbitrary." 6
A euphoric Mary Eastwood wrote to ACLU attorney Charles Morgan
that the court's opinion was "far better than I had dared hope for. It's the
most important thing to happen to women since the Nineteenth
Amendment. (At least)."'0 7 The ACLU leadership was delighted that its
long-standing litigation-centered strategy was finally bearing fruit.0 8 The
ACLU's Dorothy Kenyon, who unsuccessfully had urged the Supreme
Court to eliminate sex discrimination in jury service in Hoyt v. Florida,°9
and who had helped to argue White v. Crook in Alabama, wrote effu-
sively: "Other victories will follow. But this one turned the key in the
104. As Linda Kerber notes, the three-judge panel that heard White v. Crook "was composed of
men who had for more than a decade played a heroic part in ending [racial] segregation"-Richard T.
Rives and Frank M. Johnson were particularly notable in this regard. KERBER, supra note 25, at 198.
105. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 18, at 364 ("We could hardly contain our joy on February 7,
1966, when the federal court ruled unanimously in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to both racial and
sexual bias.").
106. White, 251 F. Supp. at 408.
107. Letter from Mary Eastwood to Charles Morgan, Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU
(Feb. 1966) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 28, on file with the Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
108. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Wins Case on Exclusion of Negroes and Women from Juries in
Alabama 2 (Feb. 28, 1966), microforned on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of
Am.) ("The federal court decision was a triumph for the ACLU's long held position that the Fourteenth
Amendment's 'equal protection of the laws' applies to women.").
109. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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lock. Like the Civil Rights Boys when the Brown decision was handed
down in 1954, 'I could cry.""'" Protectionist standard-bearer Esther
Peterson and Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women
(CACSW) Chair Margaret Hickey told the Washington Post that the deci-
sion made an ERA unnecessary."'
It soon became clear that the state of Alabama would not appeal the
White ruling, depriving the jury exclusion issue of immediate consideration
by the Supreme Court." 2 However, all was not lost, since two other jury
exclusion cases were pending in Mississippi state.'. and federal court.
Alvin Bronstein of the ACLU wrote to Catherine East in November 1966
that Willis v. Carson, a federal case challenging the exclusion of African
Americans and white women from juries, would likely be decided in favor
of the state of Mississippi." 4 Noting that this would produce a conflict be-
tween two three-judge district courts, Bronstein predicted that the Supreme
Court would soon rule on the sex discrimination issue.
Meanwhile, feminists were eager to capitalize on the White ruling in
any way they could. Peterson called a meeting with Labor and DOJ law-
yers to discuss the possible wider legal ramifications of the decision, and
wrote to her boss that she and her colleagues were considering "how we
might secure maximum publicity from the decision.""' 5 A few weeks after
the ruling, Peterson also convened a meeting of women government offi-
cials and leaders of women's organizations to discuss how to proceed. The
gathering included Hickey and East of the women's status commissions,
Eastwood of the DOJ, Mary Hilton of the Women's Bureau, and heads of
groups including the NWP, BPW, the National Association of Women
Lawyers (NAWL), and the American Association of University Women
(AAUW). Also present were Marguerite Rawalt, the sole ERA proponent
on the PCSW, and Dorothy Kenyon of the ACLU, who represented the
110. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Caroline Ware (Mar. 23, 1966) (Dorothy Kenyon Papers,
Box 17, Folder 17, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
111. Elizabeth Shelton, Verdict Stresses Women's Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1966, at B7.
112. MURRAY, supra note 18, at 364.
113. After White was not appealed to the Supreme Court, the ACLU and its allies fixed their hopes
on other cases, including one in the Mississippi Supreme Court. Letter from Melvin L. Wulf, ACLU
Legal Director, to W.P. Mitchell (lawyer for plaintiff in jury exclusion case Mississippi v. Hall, 187 So.
2d 861 (Miss. 1966)) (Oct. 13, 1966) (ACLU Records, Box 1144, Folder 4, on file with the Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University) ("I would think that the prospects for the [U.S.] Supreme
Court granting the appeal are excellent.").
114. Letter from Alvin J. Bronstein, Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee of the ACLU, to
Catherine East, Executive Secretary, Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Women,
Department of Labor (Nov. 16, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 40, Folder 706, on file with
the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University); see also Willis v. Carson, 324 F.
Supp. 1144, 1149 (S.D. Miss. 1971) (declining to address the constitutional issue).
115. Esther Peterson, Memorandum for the Secretary [of Labor] (Feb. 16, 1966) (Esther Peterson




White litigation effort. 16 The meeting clearly was an attempt by Peterson to
move beyond the divisive politics of the ERA and unify feminists behind a
Fourteenth Amendment strategy built on the White victory. Kenyon, for
one, enthusiastically accepted Peterson's invitation to a meeting that would
"include Equal Righters," for, as Kenyon put it, "[w]e are all workers in the
same vineyard."'
' 17
2. A "Philosophy of Continuity and Inclusiveness"
While Peterson was attempting to consolidate momentum behind the
Fourteenth Amendment, Pauli Murray and Alma Lutz of the NWP contin-
ued an exchange of views begun the previous winter as the White case was
coming to trial. Murray and Lutz occupied the most moderate positions in
their respective Fourteenth Amendment and ERA camps: Murray had
never been opposed to the ERA in principle, while Lutz, though vehe-
mently in favor of constitutional amendment, had never been hostile to
Black civil rights, and was at least willing to engage in a dialogue about
strategic options. Their correspondence reveals the extent to which Murray
continued to see the choice between an ERA and Fourteenth Amendment
litigation as a purely strategic matter. She believed that the courts, steeped
as they were in the emerging civil rights jurisprudence, would be receptive
to the jury exclusion issue and, moreover, that women's organizations
could unite around litigation but were not yet ready to coalesce behind a
new constitutional amendment.
As her letters indicate, Murray was also profoundly attracted to the
Fourteenth Amendment's symbolic association with racial justice. She
immediately situated herself as a civil rights activist whose defining ex-
perience had been "the Negro struggle to implement the Fourteenth
Amendment."" 8 Because women's organizations were "hopelessly divided
upon the Equal Rights Amendment," Murray wrote, "the quickest way to
obtain the results the Equal Rights Amendment is intended to produce is to
urge the courts to make clear that discrimination against women by the
state or federal governments violates the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."' " 9 She summed up her position as follows:
I think there are enough women aroused about legal rights to bring
cases through the courts; I do not believe enough of them are
aroused to secure the passage of an Equal Rights Amendment. And
so we differ not so much in our objectives as in our strategy. It is
116. Letter from Esther Peterson to Dorothy Kenyon (Apr. 13, 1966) (Esther Peterson Papers, MC
450, Box 54, Folder 1063, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
117. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Esther Peterson (Mar. 17, 1966) (Esther Peterson Papers, MC
450, Box 54, Folder 1063, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
118. Letter from Pauli Murray to Alma Lutz 1 (Dec. 9, 1965) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box
97, Folder 1730, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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just possible that through court interpretation the Equal Rights
Amendment will be written into the Constitution.
20
The White litigation, Murray added, "just may be the opening we have
been looking for.",
1 21
Murray also explained her strategic role in mediating between ERA
advocates and opponents to achieve outcomes in line with those that Lutz
sought. Murray wrote: "Some of us see our task as holding the line but not
allowing ourselves to get isolated from the women who are still confused
about how much equality they want. This is a difficult but necessary
role.' 1 22 In elaborating her strategic vision, Murray articulated what she
called her "philosophy [of] continuity and inclusiveness,"1 23 urging Lutz
and her NWP colleagues to "support us in this effort while pursuing your
own independent goals."
24
Lutz and some of her NWP colleagues were encouraged by Murray's
attitude. In January 1966, after Lutz forwarded her a copy of Murray's let-
ter, Miriam Holden commended its "important expression of opinion" to
Alice Paul.'25 Writing back to Murray, Lutz agreed that women should not
harbor ill feelings with respect to their different approaches, but expressed
frustration that women like Kenyon and Peterson were irredeemably op-
posed to the ERA as a result of "differences with the Woman's Party of
long standing, dating back to suffrage days.' 1 26 She wrote that "[i]f you
good women would only put past prejudices behind you and get behind the
Amendment, it would pass within the year."'
127
The Murray-Lutz correspondence continued after the February White
ruling. Murray wrote to Lutz in March of what she called "a salutary
byproduct of the [White v. Crook] victory"-a "movement in embryo to
reconcile the various points of view within women's groups and to give
honor to the pioneers who have kept the issue before the public,"28 un-
doubtedly a reference to NWP old-timers like Lutz, Alice Paul, and Emma
Guffey Miller. She also expressed concern about "rumours that some
women of the National Woman's Party persuasion have feared that the
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Letter from Pauli Murray to Alma Lutz 1 (Jan. 16, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box
97, Folder 1730, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
123. Letter from Pauli Murray to Alma Lutz 2 (Mar. 15, 1966) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257,
Box 5, Folder 56, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
124. Id.
125. Letter from Miriam Holden to Alice Paul (Jan. 29, 1966), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc
959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
126. Letter from Alma Lutz to Pauli Murray (Apr. 21, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box
97, Folder 1730, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
127. Id.
128. Letter from Pauli Murray to Alma Lutz 1 (Mar. 15, 1966) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257,
Box 5, Folder 56, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
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[White v. Crook] decision would hurt the chances of passage of an [Equal
Rights Amendment].' ' 29 Again, post-White, Murray reiterated her view that
feminists should be satisfied with any means that led to their desired
end: "[W]e are all after a specific result: equal rights without
discrimination on the basis solely of sex. If we can get it by court decision,
we'll take it." However, if the Supreme Court could not be convinced,
"there would be a constitutional gap which would have to be filled by a
constitutional amendment." 3'
3. "An Integral Relation ": The Unrealized Promise of the Jury
Exclusion Issue
In the end, none of the jury exclusion cases reached the Supreme
Court.13' The failure of the jury service issue to produce the "definitive
Court pronouncement" PCSW adherents sought had important conse-
quences for feminism's constitutional destiny. Combined with Nixon's
election in 1968 and concomitant expectations of increasing judicial con-
servatism, it moved feminist strategists one step closer to the conclusion
that an ERA might be necessary after all.'32 Also, these cases had provided
a compelling vehicle for connecting the civil rights and women's rights
struggles under a universalist conception of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Substantively, then, the failure of an instance of jury exclusion of African
Americans and white women to become the landmark sex discrimination
case under the Fourteenth Amendment represented a missed opportunity
for jurisprudential convergence of the Black civil rights and women's
rights causes.
Jury exclusion was a context in which the legal disabilities of African
Americans and white women converged in a way that dramatized intercon-
nections between race and sex discrimination. Kenyon and Murray, who
were working within the ACLU to heighten its consciousness about
women's rights issues, found in jury service discrimination a compelling
case with which to plead their cause. In the South, they argued-both to
their sometimes skeptical male colleagues and to the courts-there was "an
integral relation between the exclusion of women and exclusion of Negroes
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1-2.
131. The issue was eventually considered by the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975), in which a male defendant successfully challenged Louisiana's exemption of women from jury
service on Sixth Amendment grounds.
132. The Burger Court did not prove to be the reactionary institution liberals feared, but rather had
a mixed legacy, extending some Warren Court innovations and curtailing others. For an extended
discussion, see THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1998); THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983); see also Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN
COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 31-34 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (discussing the
continuities and discontinuities between the Warren and Burger Courts).
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[from jury service]." '133 Not only did women's exclusion from this central
rite of citizenship devalue their political identity, but, Murray and Kenyon
argued, the absence of white and Black women from Southern juries had
substantial material effects on the outcome of civil rights cases.
Jury service was also an issue that cut across boundaries of class, af-
fecting women from all walks of life. Though the ERA embodied the same
legal outcome Pauli Murray sought from Fourteenth Amendment litigation,
the proposed amendment retained a symbolic association with white pro-
fessional women single-mindedly devoted to formal equality and indiffer-
ent to the plight of poor women and women of color. As the next section
argues, the increasing support for the ERA that resulted from limited litiga-
tion success coincided with a perceived shift away from prioritization of
disadvantaged women's concerns. Furthermore, when political turmoil and
increasing conservative preoccupation with the "rule of law" propelled
Nixon into office in 1968, hopes of bringing a women's rights case before
the Warren Court appeared dashed. The jury exclusion issue had seemed
the perfect case to present to a Court whose reputation for creative consti-
tutional interpretation was built largely upon its expansive Fourteenth
Amendment rulings on racial issues. Now feminists would have to look
elsewhere in their quest for constitutional change.
D. "The Only Consistent Position "': Consolidation of a Dual
Constitutional Strategy, 1966-1970
When the National Organization for Women (NOW) was born at a
conference on employment discrimination in 1966,'34 legal progress was
foremost on the group's agenda. Several of the group's founding members,
including Pauli Murray, Richard Graham, and Aileen Hernandez, were at-
torneys who shared the indignation of Betty Friedan and other activists at
the EEOC's failure to prioritize the enforcement of Title VII's prohibition
on sex discrimination.135 While NOW's "targets for action" in 1966-67 in-
cluded the "support and encourage[ment of] women seeking to invoke their
right to equal protection of the law under the United States
Constitution," '136 the Organization did not immediately take a position on
133. Letter from Pauli Murray to Marguerite Rawalt (Feb. 2, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 59, Folder 999, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
134. For more on the founding of NOW, see FREEMAN, supra note 90, at 71-75; BETTY FRIEDAN,
IT CHANGED MY LIFE (2d ed. 1998); HARRISON, supra note 16, at 192-206; SUSAN M. HARTMANN,
FROM MARGIN TO MAINSTREAM: AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS SINCE i96O, at 58-62 (1996).
135. Murray, for example, had suggested since 1964 that women "needed a private
organization.., to make our point of view felt, something a little more attuned to the Space Age than
the NWP." Letter from Pauli Murray to Marguerite Rawalt 3 (Apr. 14, 1964) (Mary Eastwood Papers,
83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 7, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
136. NOW, Targets for Action 1966-67, DRAFT (Oct. 26, 1966), microformed on NWP Papers,
Misc 959, Reel I 10 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
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the ERA. But by the end of 1967, after much internal discussion and dis-
sension, the ERA had received top billing in NOW's Bill of Rights for
Women.
Part I.D will examine feminist consolidation behind a dual constitu-
tional strategy that both endorsed litigation for women's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and sought a constitutional amendment to solidify
women's equal status under the law. This consensus was not unanimously
embraced, nor was it costless. One price exacted by the acceptance of a
combined Fourteenth Amendment/ERA strategy was the reduction of
feminist legal demands to their lowest common denominator-a constitu-
tional amendment whose substantive sections retained wording not much
different from that proposed by Alice Paul in the early 1920s. In the proc-
ess, some committed feminists, Murray included, came to feel betrayed by
what they viewed as the elevation of white professional women's priorities
at the expense of unity with other movements for social justice. Moreover,
more expansive proposals for constitutional change fell by the wayside as
NOW sought to frame an agenda around which a panoply of women's
groups could unite.
Part I.D. 1 examines the controversy within NOW over the ERA, and
the alternative models of constitutional change rejected in the quest for a
unified feminist pro-ERA position. Part I.D.2 traces the increasingly preva-
lent feminist conviction that constitutional change should be sought
through a dual strategy of Fourteenth Amendment litigation and ERA ad-
vocacy by describing the dual strategy's ascendance in NOW, the BPW,
and even the NWP. Finally, Part I.D.3 relates the triumph of the dual strat-
egy within the ACLU, a longtime ERA opponent that had been, and would
continue to be, a pivotal organization for women's rights advocacy.
1. Constitutional Roads Not Taken: Human Rights Amendments and the
Price of Unity
In the heady early months of NOW's existence, feminists worked to
define their legal agenda both within the new organization and with respect
to established women's groups and constituencies. Organizational docu-
ments reflect a barely contained excitement about the possibilities for legal
breakthroughs and more general social change. NOW, many hoped, would
put an end to the marginal status of women's rights on the national political
agenda and give liberal feminists a platform from which to advance equal-
ity in employment, education, government, media imagery, reproductive
rights, the family, and the economy.
From the beginning, NOW couched its mission in terms of coopera-
tion between men and women to obtain benefits for both sexes and for
American society generally. The organization's stated purpose was "to take
action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of
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American society now.., in truly equal partnership with men," and "to
mobilize the political power of all women and men intent on our goals."''
NOW's first members were not cultural radicals or neophytes in the battle
for sex equality. Several, including former EEOC commissioners
Hernandez and Graham, as well as Mary Eastwood, Caruthers Berger, and
Catherine East, were current or former government employees or officials;
some, like Caroline Davis and Dorothy Haener of the United Auto Workers
(UAW), were labor union activists; and most, like Pauli Murray and Kay
Clarenbach, had played prominent roles on various commissions investi-
gating the status of women, including the PCSW and its descendants.'
True to her universalist predilections, Murray was intent on establish-
ing partnerships between NOW, other women's groups, and civil rights
organizations.' To her, NOW presented an opportunity to unite individu-
als and groups concerned with the status of women and with other civil
rights issues and to avoid the divisive battles of the past. She knew this to
be a delicate task, particularly on the legal front, where protective labor
legislation was still a thorny issue for women union leaders, many of
whom now believed in the desirability of an ERA but had yet to convince
their union colleagues. 4° The ERA issue was unavoidable, however, and in
early 1967, NOW established a committee to study the legal rights of
women under the federal Constitution.'41 The committee included several
longtime ERA supporters-Alma Lutz, Caruthers Berger, Marguerite
Rawalt, and Inka O'Hanrahan, also of the NWP. Mary Eastwood was a key
participant who had come to believe, since her service as technical secre-
tary to the PCSW's CCPR and her collaboration with Murray on the "Jane
Crow" article, that feminists should pursue a new amendment. Other mem-
bers, such as Phineas Indritz and Morag Simchak, had profound misgivings
about ERA advocacy.'42
The NOW committee considered several options besides embracing or
rejecting the ERA as drafted by Alice Paul decades earlier. Various
137. HARTMANN, supra note 134, at 59.
138. Id. at 58-59.
139. See, e.g., Minutes 2-4, NOW Executive Board (Nov. 20, 1966) (Betty Friedan Papers, Carton
44, Folder 1563, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(recording Murray's successful addition to the agenda of "NOW's relationship to other women's and
civil rights organizations," and the subsequent passage of a motion to initiate "concerted action" with
other interested groups).
140. FREEMAN, supra note 90, at 80; see also, e.g., Minutes of the First Board Meeting, NOW 4
(Oct. 30, 1966) (Betty Friedan Papers, Carton 44, Folder 1551, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (recording Murray's explanation to NOW members that they
should tread warily before getting involved in lawsuits that risked outlawing maximum hours laws for
women).
141. Minutes, NOW Board of Directors Meeting 6 (Feb. 22-23, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers,
Carton 44, Folder 1550, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
142. Minutes of National Conference of NOW 4-6 (Nov. 18-19, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers,
Carton 44, Folder 1550, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
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proposals were offered for discussion, including a "Human Rights
Amendment," which provided that "[t]he right to equal treatment, without
differentiation based on sex, shall not be denied by the United States or by
any State," that "[n]o public funds shall be granted or loaned and no special
tax exemption or privilege shall be accorded by the United States or by any
State to any person who discriminates on the basis of race, color, sex,
national origin, or ancestry," and that "[t]he right of a woman to terminate
a pregnancy under medical supervision shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State.' 43
One of the most daunting obstacles to such innovative approaches was
the NWP's existing base of support for the ERA as drafted in the 1920s
and modified in the 1940s. 44 The NWP adamantly opposed even the
smallest, nonsubstantive changes in the ERA's language. When Betty
Friedan proposed that the words "equal treatment" be substituted for the
phrase "equality of rights under the law,"'' 45 Alice Paul and her minions
quickly quashed this modest "New Amendment for a New Era" initia-
tive. 146 Other slight alterations in wording were also rejected out of hand.
147
143. Human Rights Amendment, in Proposal for NOW (Jan. 1, 1967) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-
M257, Carton 3, Folder 12, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
144. The original text composed by Paul in 1923 read: "Men and women shall have equal rights
throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE
ERA 121 (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986). After revisions in 1943, the amendment's text read:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex. Congress and the several States shall have power, within their
respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. This amendment
shall not require uniformity of legislation among the several States, the District of Columbia,
the Territories, and possessions of the United States.
Id. The final ERA, as passed in 1972, retained the first sentence of the 1943 version, granted exclusive
enforcement power to Congress, and provided that the amendment would take effect two years after
ratification. Id. at 125.
145. The proposed change was an effort to clarify that the ERA would permit no protective
legislation for women.
The new language is more precise and therefore more sure. It is less susceptable [sic] to being
watered down by the courts .... Under the new language there would be no issue of whether
the particular sex classification were permissible in a given situation brought before the
courts since by its very words, no such different treatment based on sex could be made by the
government.
For Discussion Purposes Only: Proposal: That NOW Support a Constitutional Amendment, but with
New Language (Apr. 21, 1967) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 3, Folder 12, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
146. For an account of Paul's rejection of the proposal, see Letter from Amelia Fry to Mary
Eastwood (Oct. 12, 1979) and attached oral history (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 3, Folder
12, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
147. See, e.g., Harriet Bradford, Proposed Rewording of the Equal Rights Amendment (Spring
1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1486, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University); Letter from Alma Lutz to Betty Friedan (Mar. 13, 1967) (Betty Friedan
Papers, Box 42, Folder 1486, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) (rejecting Bradford's proposal); Letter from Alma Lutz to Betty Friedan (Apr. 24, 1967)
(Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1486, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
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The NWP disdained any changes-in wording or underlying meaning-to
the amendment it had championed for so long.
Their steadfast insistence on retaining the old ERA language reflected
the NWP's distrust of NOW's more expansive agenda. Although NOW
was staid and mainstream on the spectrum of late 1960s feminism, to the
NWP-now composed primarily of much older women, some of whom
had themselves participated in the suffrage struggle in their youth 4 -
NOW was full of young upstarts with radical ideas about marriage, gender
roles, and reproductive rights. Miriam Holden wrote to an NWP colleague
in February 1967 of the need to "disassociate ourselves from the current
wave of activity" concerning "problems of sexual or psychological
supremacy.' 1 49 Holden feared that "[t]he idea of 'equal rights' ... ha[d]
been debased," and that the burgeoning women's movement was producing
a "mass fear that American women are seeking to pre-empt the masculine
role in our society."'"5 To stem the tide of these "negative emotional
reactions," Holden argued that the NWP should "include the word
legal... [e]ach time our Amendment is mentioned... [since] our
Amendment is aimed solely at remedying the legal disabilities of
American women."'151
After meeting with Alice Paul and other NWP stalwarts, Eastwood
became convinced that the most prudent course of action was for NOW to
endorse the ERA and work in concert with the NWP and other pro-ERA
groups.' At the same time, NOW was coming under increasing pressure
from other activists to endorse the existing language of the ERA.'53 Alma
Lutz wrote Betty Friedan a series of letters in 1967 strongly urging her to
Harvard University) ("With [eighty-eight supporting Senators and eighty-six House supporters]
available, it would seem very foolish to introduce a different wording.").
148. For instance, in 1967, Miriam Holden would turn seventy-four, Alma Lutz seventy-seven,
Emma Guffey Miller ninety-three, and Alice Paul eighty-two.
149. Letter from Miriam Holden to Miss Newell (Feb. 11, 1967), microformed on NWP Papers,
Misc 959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. A year earlier, Eastwood had been hesitant to suggest that NOW tackle the ERA issue right
away, expressing her own preference that NOW "wait a year or two on the issue of a constitutional
amendment until we see how well the courts can do under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,"
though she did believe that raising the ERA issue in NOW "might serve to separate the women from
the girls, i.e. those who believe in equality from those who 'want to have their cake and eat it too."'
Letter from Mary Eastwood to Inka O'Hanrahan 2 (July 25, 1966) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42,
Folder 1481, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University); see also
Letter from Mary Eastwood to Betty Friedan (Aug. 1966) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1481,
on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) ("Inka O'Hanrahan wrote
asking my views on how to get the equal rights amendment through Congress.... She obviously
assumed that anyone who is for women is for the amendment and suggested N.O.W. might urge its
passage. I don't think Kay Clarenbach... or Caroline Ware, e.g. would like that idea at all.").
153. Rupp and Taylor argue that the NWP's prompting was largely responsible for NOW's
endorsement of the ERA in 1967. RuPp & TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 182.
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convince NOW of the ERA's merits, 5 4  and by the fall, NOW's
Washington, D.C. chapter had passed a resolution giving unequivocal sup-
port to the amendment.'55 On the other hand, Marguerite Rawalt, the
PCSW's lone ERA supporter five years earlier, was hesitant. Her enthusi-
asm for the amendment remained undiminished, but she worried that a re-
jection of the ERA, coming from the well-publicized NOW, would be
devastating for its chances.'56 Further, Rawalt believed that a Fourteenth
Amendment breakthrough might be forthcoming in the litigation to which
she had, at age seventy-two, dedicated herself almost full-time.'57 Pauli
Murray, for her part, was principally concerned that NOW's endorsement
of the ERA would alienate labor union women and isolate the issue of
women's rights from broader civil rights and human rights goals.
Despite trepidation among some key members about raising the ERA
issue at this early juncture,'58 constitutional change and women's legal
154. See, e.g., Letter from Alma Lutz to Betty Friedan (Mar. 13, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box
42, Folder 1486, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) ("The
outlook for [the ERA] in the 90th Congress is good. Why let past prejudices stand in the way[?] The
important thing is to let Congress know that women demand an Equal Rights Amendment."); Letter
from Alma Lutz to Betty Friedan (Apr. 24, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1486, on file
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) ("[M]ay I make another plea by
mail that NOW endorse the Equal Rights for Women Amendment."). In yet another appeal, Lutz wrote:
I feel I must again remind you that test cases to bring about more up-to-date Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution are only playing with the problem as they will not be a
permanent solution, no matter how much Esther Peterson may recommend them. Only an
amendment, writing no sex discrimination into the Constitution will wipe out the Common
Law valuation of women .... Why do you hold back from supporting this Amendment?
Letter from Alma Lutz to Betty Friedan (Aug. 19, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1486,
on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
155. National Capital Area NOW, Resolution (Nov. 19, 1967), microformed on NWP Papers,
Misc 959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.) ("WHEREAS, women have been unsuccessfully
seeking equal rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
through litigation extending over a full century... WHEREAS, the Equal Rights Amendment would
unequivocally secure the right to equal treatment under the law without differentiation based on sex.").
156. PATERSON, supra note 25, at 177.
157. Id.; see also Letter from Marguerite Rawalt to Betty Friedan, Kay Clarenbach, and Inka
O'Hanrahan 2 (Nov. 21, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1491, on file with the Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) ("I am delighted that the Conference took its stand on
the Equal Rights Amendment and on employment rights. [But] I was disappointed that the press
conference did not emphasize the work we have done and are doing in the name of NOW in the
courts.").
158. According to confidential notes prepared for Friedan the week before the November
Conference, NOW's leadership was well aware of many contours of the impending confrontation,
including the imminent departure of labor union women if NOW endorsed the ERA. Confidential
Notes for Betty Friedan, President of NOW (Nov. 11, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder
1491, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) ("Whatever may be
the personal views of [UAW women], they are completely powerless to influence the UAW position at
this point, and unless they are willing to give up their jobs, the presence of [other UAW leaders] at the
NOW Conference will make it impossible for them to work with us."). They anticipated a variety of
diversionary tactics on the part of ERA opponents, including proposals to delay the endorsement
decision and support alternative language for the amendment, as well as dire predictions of
congressional defeat. Id.
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status topped the agenda at NOW's second annual conference in
November. Organizers set aside the Saturday afternoon session for a spe-
cial all-conference discussion of the ERA and abortion, the two most
contentious issues facing the young organization. 159 As expected, the
debate was long and vigorous. UAW representatives Dorothy Haener and
Caroline Davis requested that NOW delay its endorsement of the ERA and
grant them more time to convince labor leaders of its merits, while Phineas
Indritz warned that a new amendment had no chance of passing Congress
and urged instead the continued pursuit of litigation under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
160
Hoping to head off a direct confrontation between the remnants of
protectionism and the growing equalitarian impulse-and, moreover, be-
tween women with deep loyalties to other causes and those for whom
women's rights had become the primary preoccupation-Murray stepped
in to assume her time-honored mediating role.161 In place of a resolution
committing NOW to full and immediate support of the ERA, she made a
substitute motion, which would have sent the pro-ERA resolution to local
NOW chapters to study for a period of seven months before making a final
decision among three alternatives: endorse the ERA as is, endorse an al-
ternative amendment with different wording, or incorporate the ERA into a
general Human Rights Amendment that would include other forms of dis-
crimination alongside sex. 16 2 As the conference minutes recorded, "much
discussion followed,"'163 but the Murray motion was only able to muster
fifteen votes, while eighty-two voted against the substitute and for NOW's
immediate endorsement of the ERA."6
With NOW's embrace of the ERA, feminism had taken a momentous
step toward a dual constitutional strategy, one that would combine litiga-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment with active advocacy for the ERA.
But the price was high. As NOW leaders had anticipated, some labor union
women felt compelled to resign from NOW's leadership, and Murray, the
organization's strongest voice for collaboration with other civil rights
159. 1967 National Conference of N.O.W. Schedule (Nov. 1, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Carton
44, Folder 1550, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
160. PATERSON, supra note 25, at 180; Minutes of the NOW Conference (Nov. 18, 1967) (Betty
Friedan Papers, Carton 44, Folder 1553, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University).
161. According to one set of minutes, Murray spoke straightforwardly of her concern that a strong
stance on the ERA would "alienate organizations who have given us support until now." Minutes of the
NOW Conference, supra note 160. Barbara Ireton of the Washington, D.C. chapter of NOW, which
sponsored the resolution, retorted that NOW had the support of many organizations behind the ERA
already. Id.
162. Minutes of National Conference of NOW (Nov. 18-19, 1967) (Betty Friedan Papers, Carton





causes,165 left the conference "deeply disillusioned."' 166 Three days later, she
wrote an anguished letter to Clarenbach, expressing her fear that a single-
minded focus on the ERA would confine the movement "almost solely to
'women's rights' without strong bonds with other movements toward
human rights."'67 Furthermore, Murray felt that such an approach "might
develop into a head-on collision" with Black civil rights and other strug-
gles. 168 While Murray did not oppose the ERA per se, she felt that concen-
trating on the amendment in light of other groups' misgivings
compromised the multiplicity of her own identity and her aspirations for
the feminist movement. Murray told Clarenbach of her "inability to be
fragmented into Negro at one time, woman at another, or worker at
another.' 1 69 Although Murray remained in close touch with Mary Eastwood
and other NOW activists, she decided to pursue her feminist legal
agenda-including, eventually, explicit support for the ERA-within the
ACLU's broader-based organization. 7 '
The significance of NOW's endorsement of the ERA in 1967 went
beyond its symbolic exclusion of voices like Murray's.' 71 In a very real
165. Aileen Hernandez and others also spoke out on behalf of building connections with racial
minority groups. See, e.g., Letter from Aileen Hemandez to Muriel Fox (Oct. 21, 1967) (Betty Friedan
Papers, Box 42, Folder 1484, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) ("I still think NOW needs to find ways of gaining more appeal in the minority communities
and perhaps Dollie [Robinson] and Pauli [Murray] can act as one bridge [as NOW Board Members].").
166. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 189.
167. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 190 (quoting Letter from Pauli Murray to Kathryn Clarenbach
(Nov. 21, 1967) (Pauli Murray Papers, Box 51, Folder 899, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University )).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Her estrangement from NOW must have been particularly devastating given the faith she had
placed in women's solidarity. In January 1966, the fifty-five-year-old Murray had written exultantly to
Eastwood that she had found a place within feminism that the civil rights movement had theretofore
denied her:
[O]ur involvement in advancing the status of women gives us meaning and focus to our lives.
My acute sensitivity to all of this stems directly from a kind of fateful exclusion from the
inner circle of civil rights activities. In other words, having an intellect and an equalitarian
point of view has been almost a handicap to me in finding a place in the civil rights struggle,
as if it were a threat to male colleagues. No one, however, can deny me the right to speak out
on behalf of women. Hooray for our side!
Letter from Pauli Murray to Mary Eastwood (Jan. 19, 1966) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Box 5,
Folder 56, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University). She left NOW
less than two years later, feeling "like a stranger in my own household ... passd, old, and declassed."
Letter from Pauli Murray to Kathryn Clarenbach, supra note 167, quoted in HARTMANN, supra note 25,
at 190.
171. Eastwood, for one, regretted that the ERA controversy at the 1967 Conference had
"alienate[d] some of [NOW's] staunchest feminists and original organizers," including Murray. "[Did
we railroad [the ERA] through?" Eastwood wondered several months later. If so, Eastwood said, she
and others had done so because they were "running scared and the principle [was] desperately
important" to them. "What I am trying to say," she wrote to Murray, "is that I am not sorry for what we
did, but I wish you were all actively working with us. Had we known we could win by such a
tremendous margin, we could have been more conciliatory, kind and patient." But Eastwood also
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sense, the conference vote constricted the horizon of constitutional possi-
bilities feminists would pursue in the following decade. In choosing to en-
dorse the model of women's rights embodied by the ERA, NOW rejected
alternative formulations of sex discrimination as enmeshed in other forms
of inequality, extending beyond formal state action, and requiring an ex-
plicit constitutional guarantee of reproductive freedom.12 Instead, NOW's
resolution enshrined the articulation of equality the NWP had promoted for
so many decades, complete with its isolation from racial and other forms of
discrimination, as well as its separation from reproductive rights. As a re-
sult, NOW lost many women who found themselves unable conscien-
tiously to sustain their loyalties to other causes while committing
themselves to NOW's vision of women's rights. At the same time, NOW
was also on the verge of spawning more radical offshoot groups of mostly
younger women who could not abide NOW's cultivation of a staid, main-
stream, non-militant image.'73
NOW did not, of course, dissociate itself from abortion rights-far
from it. Indeed, the discussion immediately following the Organization's
endorsement of the ERA at the 1967 conference concluded with a resound-
ing, though initially controversial, endorsement of women's reproductive
freedom and a call for the repeal of laws criminalizing abortion. 174 But as a
constitutional matter, NOW adopted a view of reproductive rights as sepa-
rate from legal equality under an ERA. Later, as feminists assiduously built
the ERA's legislative history, and as they promoted its ratification in the
wake of the controversial Roe v. Wade decision, they were careful to reas-
sure skeptics that the amendment in no way implicated abortion rights.
7 5
acknowledged that if NOW had not endorsed the ERA, the organization would have lost her support.
"Had we lost," she wrote, "I would not be in NOW, but a new more militant organization would have
been formed." Letter from Mary Eastwood to Pauli Murray (May 27, 1968) (Mary Eastwood Papers,
83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 4, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
172. In addition to "Human Rights Amendments" that encompassed multiple issues, NOW
considered a freestanding reproductive freedom amendment that read, "The right of a woman to
prevent conception and with proper medical safeguards to terminate her pregnancy shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state." According to its proponents, "The effect of this
amendment would be to nullify all existing state criminal abortion laws, leaving the question of
whether or not to have an abortion a matter for the woman herself, rather than the government, to
decide." NOW, The Right of a Woman to Determine Her Own Reproductive Process, Document II
(Betty Friedan Papers, Carton 44, Folder 1553, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Insitute,
Harvard University).
173. For more on the splintering of new groups led by disaffected NOW members, see ALICE
ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA, 1967-1975, at 167-69 (1989);
HARTMANN, supra note 134, at 62-66; FREEMAN, supra note 90, at 81-83; RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD
SPLIT OPEN: How THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 81-89 (2000).
174. Minutes of National Conference of NOW, supra note 162.
175. See, e.g., MANSBRIDGE, supra note 9, at 122-28; DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE
HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA 158 (1990).
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The Human Rights Amendment did enjoy a brief renaissance in 1968
when some NOW members attempted its resurrection, but Mary Eastwood
recognized its dismal prospects for success. The NWP and other long-time
ERA supporters, she realized, were vehemently opposed to any changes to
the ERA's text. 7 6 In fact, many of these women were deeply uncomfort-
able associating issues such as reproductive freedom and discrimination
against racial minorities with women's rights under the Constitution. It was
these NWP stalwarts who had labored for so many years to pass Alice
Paul's ERA, and though a new wave of feminism rendered their style of
advocacy increasingly obsolete, they successfully clung to the amend-
ment's original text and thereby ensured that their legal legacy would lin-
ger long after the NWP was a dead letter.
2. "The ERA Need Not Compete with the Fourteenth Amendment": The
Dual Strategy Ascendant
Pauli Murray's profound alienation from NOW notwithstanding, the
strategic approach to constitutional change she had articulated to Alma
Lutz began to win adherents within NOW and among some feminists who
had long supported the ERA. A consensus was developing around the
proposition that Fourteenth Amendment litigation and agitation for a con-
stitutional amendment could and should be pursued simultaneously. In
NOW, in the BPW, and even, to some extent, within the NWP, the years
1967 and 1968 saw an unprecedented articulation of this dual constitu-
tional strategy.
A 1967 debate within the BPW highlighted the controversial nature of
any dual approach within an organization that had long supported the ERA.
The dispute centered on whether the BPW's platform should include, in
addition to an endorsement of the ERA, a provision "encourage[ing]
judicial determination of existing legislation."''7 7 NWP members and ardent
ERA advocates within the BPW urged that the "judicial determination"
clause be excluded from the platform, fearing that any qualifying clause
would "dilute" the organization's "clear-cut position" on constitutional
176. See Letter from Mary Eastwood to Jean Witter (Sept. 2, 1968) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-
M257, Box 4, Folder 50, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
Pauli Murray persisted in offering more expansive alternatives to the ERA until as late as 1970. See
Letter from Pauli Murray to Editor, Boston Globe (Aug. 24, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box
86, Folder 1497, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(suggesting an amendment that would "prohibit discrimination against any person based upon age,
color, economic status, national origin, political belief, race, religion, sex, social status or any other
non-merit factor," and would "apply not only to the United States or any State but also to private
action").
177. Letter from Margaret V. Donnelly, Past President, Delaware Federation of BPW, to Hazel
Palmer, Legislation Steering Committee, BPW (July 17, 1967), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc
959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
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amendment. 178 They failed, and the BPW went on record as supporting
multiple paths to women's legal equality. 1
79
Meanwhile, some NWP members were having second thoughts about
the Party's single-minded approach to the ERA. In 1967, Caruthers
Gholsen Berger, an attorney who maintained her active membership in the
NWP after joining NOW the previous year, proposed revisions to the
NWP's primary position statement on the ERA: "Questions and Answers
on the Equal Rights Amendment."' 8 ° The original "Questions and
Answers" had taken the position that the existing federal Constitution ex-
cluded women from its coverage and declared the quest for a favorable
Fourteenth Amendment ruling hopeless. 8' Berger's suggested revisions
included the deletion or substitution of all statements in "Questions and
Answers" that undermined women's attempts to encourage the judicial re-
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The ERA," she declared,
"need not compete with the 14th amendment."' 82
Mary Eastwood, still a DOJ attorney and now one of NOW's primary
legal strategists, most elaborately and self-consciously articulated the new
dual constitutional strategy. By the fall 1967 NOW national meeting,
Eastwood had grown impatient with entrenched attitudes that pitted the
two constitutional strategies against one another. She wrote to Murray that
she "hope[d] everyone doesn't come to the conference with their same old
prejudices for and against the amendment. If anyone says women aren't
persons under the 14th amendment, or that the ERA can't pass because it
hasn't passed since 1923, I think I will scream.' 83 Eastwood had come to
believe that, rather than being at cross-purposes, the two strategies
178. Id.
179. NWP official Margery Leonard saw Murray's hand in the controversy, remarking to Party
Chairman Mary Birckhead that Murray was "doing a fine job of sabotage." Letter from Margery
Leonard to Mary Birckhead (July 20, 1967), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 110
(Microfilming Corp. of Am.). NWP member Nina Horton Avery attended the BPW convention with
the sole purpose of persuading the group to exclude from their plank the "qualifying verbiage" she
believed would compromise the ERA effort. Letter from Nina Horton Avery to Alice Paul and Mary
Birckhead (Aug. 1967), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of
Am.).
180. NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, Oct.
2, 1962 (Margery C. Leonard ed., 4th ed. 1963), S. Doc. No. 87-162 (1962) [hereinafter NWP,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, Oct 2, 1962].
181. NWP, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, Oct 2., 1962, supra note 180. See also Law Suits vs, the
Equal Rights for Women Amendment, NWP BULLETIN, July-Aug. 1967, at 1-5 (Mary Eastwood Papers,
83-M257, Carton 3, Folder 14, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) (taking the same position as late as the summer of 1967).
182. Caruthers G. Berger, Comments on Questions and Answers on the Equal Rights Amendment
(Sept. 22, 1967), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel 110 (Microfilming Corp. of Am.)
(emphasis in original).
183. Letter from Mary Eastwood to Pauli Murray 2 (Oct. 26, 1967) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-




complemented one another. She declared to Murray that "[b]eing for
pursuing the '14th amendment approach' [and] being for the ERA is the
only consistent position."'84 Eastwood explained her views in a document
prepared earlier for NOW:
As a matter of tacktics [sic], even if the ERA fails to pass,
vigorously pushing for it will show women are demanding equal
rights and responsibilities under the law by the most drastic legal
means possible-a constitutional amendment. The effect, provided
we make clear we think [the] 14 th [amendment] properly
interpreted should give women [the] same unqualified protection,
would be to improve our chances of winning 14th amendment
cases. 1
85
In another important statement circulated within women's rights organiza-
tions, Eastwood formalized the dual strategy, emphasizing that ERA advo-
cacy and litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment were complementary
endeavors and that both were crucial to the expeditious achievement of
equality.'86 By 1968, the dual approach was the more-or-less official posi-
tion of NOW.187
In the new climate of feminist mobilization and concomitantly in-
creasing publicity,'88 the ERA had become a promising focal point for
women's rights activism. Still, feminist strategists were far from ready to
abandon the Fourteenth Amendment approach, which held its own promise
both for the achievement of concrete results and as an enticement to femi-
nists still opposed to an ERA. Indeed, some, like Marguerite Rawalt, de-
voted themselves wholeheartedly to litigation under the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as under Title VII even as they continued to advocate
an ERA. Strategists had made great strides in building support for a dual
184. Id. ("[T]he more support [there] is for a new amendment, the better the chances for winning
under the 14th .... [T]he converse is also true: winning under the 14th improves chances for [ERA]
passage.").
185. Mary Eastwood, Proposal for NOW (Jan. 1, 1967) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton
3, Folder 12, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (emphasis
added).
186. Mary 0. Eastwood, Constitutional Protection Against Sex Discrimination: An Informational
Memorandum Prepared for the National Organization for Women (NOW) Regarding the Equal Rights
Amendment and Similar Proposals (Nov. 1967), microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel I 10
(Microfilming Corp. of Am.).
187. NOW, NOW Bill of Rights for 1968, microformed on NWP Papers, Misc 959, Reel III
(Microfilming Corp. of Am.) (describing the ERA as the top priority); Jean Witter, Suggested Future
Directions for N.O.W. (July 20, 1968) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Box 4, Folder 50, on file
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (announcing the intention to
continue providing financial and legal support for Fourteenth Amendment litigation).
188. FREEMAN, supra note 90, at 148-50; HARTMANN, supra note 134, at 66; ROSEN, supra note
173, at 298. Both Freeman and Rosen note that press coverage of the women's movement became more
sympathetic in the late 1960s as female journalists sent to cover movement events often wrote of their
experiences as conversions to feminism. FREEMAN, supra note 90, at 114; ROSEN, supra note 173, at
298.
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strategy among ERA proponents, convincing them that support for litiga-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment was no longer a euphemism for anti-
ERA sentiment.
3. "New Tools for the Tools that Have Failed You ": The Dual Strategy
Triumphant
Now that NOW, the BPW, and at least one contingent of the NWP
had coalesced around the dual approach, all that remained was to persuade
the remaining protectionists-and women's rights skeptics-of the need
for an equalitarian approach. Though disenchantment with NOW had pro-
voked her departure from its leadership, Pauli Murray remained a stalwart
member of the ACLU Equality Committee, 189 and it was there that she re-
solved to continue her efforts on behalf of women's rights. 9° In early 1968,
shortly after her painful experience at NOW's national meeting, Murray
wrote to Eastwood that she had undertaken a campaign within the ACLU
to "develop a clean cut statement which would harmonize with our position
in 'Jane Crow' and eliminate [support for] 'differential social
legislation." '19' She also hoped the Equality Committee would "eliminate
reference to opposition to a special constitutional amendment and simply
take a positive view of the 14th amendment and oppose legislation based
on sex per se."' 92 But, Murray recognized, "This may not be easy to do in
view of the long history of ACLU opposition to the Equal Rights
Amendment."' 93
Murray was correct in her prediction that convincing the ACLU to
embrace sex egalitarianism would be an uphill battle. As historian Susan
Hartmann has recounted, the ACLU tended to discount the importance of
women's rights on the one hand and cling to protective labor legislation on
189. Murray had served on the Equality Committee since early 1966. Minutes, ACLU Equality
Committee (Feb. 3, 1966) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (introducing Murray as new committee
member).
190. See, e.g., Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 4 (Nov. 30, 1967) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(reporting Murray's urging that the ACLU "recognize that classification by race and sex are equally
immoral. For many years the Union has taken the position that a new amendment for women's rights is
not necessary. If not, it is time for the Union to get a case to the Supreme Court recognizing that
women are entitled to employment on the basis of individual merit."); Minutes, ACLU Equality
Committee (Dec. 28, 1967) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Minutes, ACLU Equality
Committee (Dec. 28, 1967)] (urging the ACLU to reconsider its policy on protective legislation and
adopt an equalitarian approach).
191. Letter from Pauli Murray to Mary Eastwood (Jan. 25, 1968) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-





the other.194 Responding to the rising tide of masculinism in certain strands
of the civil rights movement, 95 and often seeing the fight against sex dis-
crimination as diverting resources from the battle for racial equality, 96 the
men who dominated the ACLU leadership explicitly prioritized the em-
powerment of Black men in the mid-1960s, leaving women's concerns for
later resolution. 97 They also worried that opposing protective legislation
for women would undermine the ACLU's relationship with labor organiza-
tions that supported these laws.' 9
In short, Murray's role in women's organizations had been to recon-
cile many feminists' commitment to civil rights and labor causes with oth-
ers' single-minded focus on women's rights. Now, in the ACLU, she found
herself emphasizing the compatibility of sex equality with the ACLU's
primary goals and allegiances, to which women's rights had often been
tangential. In doing so, she had a powerful ally in Dorothy Kenyon, who
had long promoted women's rights within the ACLU even as she opposed
the ERA and supported protective labor legislation. 99 By the late 1960s,
Murray had convinced Kenyon that differential protective laws for men
and women were undesirable;200  accordingly, Kenyon increasingly
194. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 72-73. Hartmann observes that the ACLU "adopted a feminist
agenda" only "because of the deliberate efforts of card-carrying feminists to infiltrate and capture it."
Id. at 56.
195. For more on the gender ideologies of the Black Power movement, see ELAINE BROWN, A
TASTE OF POWER: A BLACK WOMAN'S STORY (1992); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I
ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 314-24 (1984); JACQUELINE
JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY
TO THE PRESENT 310-21 (1985). Also influential during this period was the Moynihan Report, which
attributed the "breakdown" of African-American families in part to an enduring tradition of Black
matriarchy. Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Moynihan Report, The Negro
Family: A Case for National Action (1965). For a contemporary review of the debate surrounding the
Moynihan Report, see LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY (1967). For historians' perspectives, see GIDDINGS, supra, at 325-35;
JONES, supra.
196. See, e.g., Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee (June 6, 1968) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412,
Box 54, Folder 943, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(describing debate over ACLU priorities in which Murray argued against her colleagues' insistence that
combating racial discrimination was more important than attacking sex discrimination).
197. See, e.g., Minutes, ACLU Equality Committee 4 (Dec. 28, 1967), supra note 190 ("[CORE
director Floyd] McKissick noted that the circumstances in 1967 are changed. For example, CORE's
Board of Directors has decided that black power is the method to be used to bring about equality. Thus,
at the moment CORE is emphasizing black male power, and tomorrow will concentrate on the equality
of women."); see also KERBER, supra note 25, at 195-96 (discussing McKissick's comments and
Murray's response).
198. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 72-73.
199. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dorothy Kenyon to ACLU Board Members, Re: Restatement
of ACLU Position in Favor of Women's Rights (June 15, 1955) (Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 30,
Folder 17, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
200. As Kenyon wrote,
As for our position on Constitution-we believe XIV Amendment includes women in its
coverage of non-discrimination (with permission for differential legislation if needed to effect
genuine rather than mathematical equality). We also agree (at least Pauli M. and I do ... )
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emphasized the inherent virtues of gaining a favorable interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which, she maintained, was the appropriate con-
stitutional provision in which to locate sex equality. In March 1970, she
wrote to an ACLU colleague:
I believe that a separate amendment for women alone (as though
they weren't even "people" within the meaning of the constitution
but a second class s[la]ve type of worm) would be denigrating and
degrading (as well as difficult to evaluate or fathom the meaning of
in constitutional terms). I therefore hang my hat on the 14th
Amendment.'O°
Even Kenyon, however, grew frustrated with the slow pace of change in
attitudes toward women's rights, expressing her exasperation in an April
1970 letter: "I know exactly how the Black Panthers feel, ignored[,]
passed over, segregated (intellectually at least), and frustrated until they are
ready to kill."20 2 In June, Kenyon wrote to Betsy Nolan that while focusing
on the Fourteenth Amendment was her preferred strategy, "in the
meantime it's worth passing the equal rights amendment if only to stir up
the men." ' 3
Before 1970, Murray, Kenyon, Eastwood, and other sympathetic par-
ties were mostly thwarted in their efforts to make sweeping changes in
ACLU policy. 24 But in 1969, the EEOC interpreted Title VII to prohibit
protective legislation for women only. This removed one of the few re-
maining barriers to ERA support, °5 providing pro-equality forces within
the ACLU with a new weapon in their arsenal of arguments for an egalitar-
ian policy.20 6 As feminist groups, divided over many other aspects of their
that the differentiation into 'men' and 'women' is no longer a reasonable one, if it ever was,
and that the use of the classification 'women' qua 'women' is unfair and in itself
unconstitutional.
Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Harriet Pilpel (Feb. 7, 1968) (Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 29, Folder
11, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
201. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Louise Noun, ACLU (Mar. 26, 1970) (Dorothy Kenyon
Papers, Box 29, Folder 1, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
202. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Rolland O'Hare 1-2 (Apr. 20, 1970) (Dorothy Kenyon
Papers, Box 29, Folder 1, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
203. Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Betsy Nolan, ACLU (June 29, 1970) (Dorothy Kenyon
Papers, Box 29, Folder I, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
204. See, e.g., Letter from Pauli Murray to Mary Eastwood (Jan. 3, 1969) (Mary Eastwood Papers,
83-M257, Carton 1, Folder 4, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) ("[T]he ACLU Board met, rejected [20-4] our entire statement and adopted [a statement
less favorable to the dual strategy] .... [T]he male bigotry was too strong to overcome. With this
statement, we have moved hardly an inch, but it does get rid of a lot of the verbiage in the former
policy statement we were trying to replace.").
205. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 74.
206. See, e.g., Memorandum from Susan Deller Ross, ACLU Position on Sex Discrimination and
Protective Legislation (Mar. 17, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 55, Folder 958, on file with
the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
[W]hen the Board reached its 1968 decision [to reject the equalitarian proposal], the effect of
Title VII [on protective laws] ... was not known. In light of new developments and
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agendas, managed to coalesce around the ERA, Murray and Kenyon were
inspired to declare openly their support for a new constitutional amend-
ment. Murray wrote a forceful memorandum in March 1970 "urg[ing] as
strongly as I can that ACLU not testify in opposition to the [ERA],"2" 7 then
before Congress. She reiterated her support for the Fourteenth Amendment
approach, but wrote that she did not "believe today that the alternative of
the use of the Fourteenth Amendment is a sufficient basis for strong
opposition to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.""2 8
Murray made three interrelated arguments to the ACLU urging the
group to drop its opposition to the ERA and embrace a dual constitutional
strategy. First, she asserted, given the EEOC's clarification of Title VII's
applicability to sex-differentiating protective legislation, "the basis on
which ACLU has rested its traditional opposition to the Equal Rights
Amendment fails."' 9 Second, Murray noted that recent developments had
rendered the Fourteenth Amendment strategy somewhat less promising,
and that it was only a matter of time before Nixon packed the Court with
strict constructionists likely to be less than sympathetic to expansive inter-
pretations of the Constitution.2
Finally, Murray turned what had once been her chief argument for
pursuing constitutional change through the Fourteenth Amendment into an
impetus for acquiescing to the ERA proponents:
The most potent reason for not oppos[ing] the Equal Rights
Amendment in the civil rights climate of 1970 is that, by taking a
negative position, ACLU will not be able to avoid the impression
that it is denying the proposition that civil rights are indivisible and
that wherever discrimination is accepted against one disadvantaged
group all others are in jeopardy.2"'
While previously she had embraced the Fourteenth Amendment approach
as the best means of linking Black civil rights and women's rights goals,
now that feminists were mobilizing behind an ERA, Murray believed that a
clarification of Title VII by the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and a considerable upsurge in complaints from women to the Union and to other
organizations concerning discrimination, the Board is being asked to review its policy in this
area.
Id. at 2.
207. Memorandum from Pauli Murray to ACLU Equality Committee, Re: ACLU Position on Sex
Discrimination 2 (Mar. 30, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 55, Folder 959, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Memorandum from Murray
(Mar. 30, 1970)] (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2-3.
210. Id. at 3. Kenyon, too, was chagrined by the prospect of Nixon appointees on the Court. See
HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 80; Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Larry Speiser (June 3, 1971)
(Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 29, Folder 2, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
211. Memorandum from Murray (Mar. 30, 1970), supra note 207, at 3.
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universalist human rights approach required civil rights organizations to
open their minds and their agendas to a new constitutional amendment.
Murray enlisted the help of Kenyon, who then declared her support
for the ERA in a memorandum to the ACLU Board: "We still approve of
the XIV Amendment approach," Kenyon wrote for herself and Murray. "I
think we all do. But in spite of heroic efforts on the part of women as well
as of ACLU, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected us as having no
place under it."'2 12 Noting the failure of White v. Crook, the ACLU's pri-
mary effort in the women's rights area, to reach the Court, Kenyon and
Murray emphasized the likely ideological bent of upcoming judicial ap-
pointments under the Nixon administration. 213 "There comes a time when
you cannot wait any longer, when you must find new tools for the tools
that have failed you," Kenyon wrote. "This I believe is such a time. '214 Six
days later, the ACLU Board endorsed the ERA.215
By 1970, then, most legal feminists had reached a consensus that the
constitutional change they sought could and should be pursued simultane-
ously through the dual strategy. For the protectionist stalwart Esther
Peterson, conversion would take a little more time, but when she finally
endorsed the ERA in 1971, it was with characteristic graciousness. She
wrote to longtime ERA advocate Rep. Martha Griffiths in October that
"[a]fter much soul searching," she had "come to the conclusion that the
time for waiting for court action is past and enactment of the equal rights
amendment would be a constructive step."2 6 She continued:
212. Memorandum from Pauli Murray & Dorothy Kenyon to the Board of the ACLU,
Re: Women's Rights. The Equal Rights Amendment: Should We Favor It, and If So, Why? (Sept. 24,
1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 55, Folder 956, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University); see also Memorandum from Dorothy Kenyon to the ACLU
Board of Directors, Re: Why the Equal Rights Amendment for Women? 2 (Dec. 1, 1970) (Pauli
Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 55, Folder 956, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University) ("The Supreme Court has not just ignored us, as Professor Paul Freund seems to
think... but has rejected us outright.").
213. Memorandum from Pauli Murray & Dorothy Kenyon to the Board of the ACLU, supra note
212 ("The courts, facing a large number of new appointments to the judiciary by a president committed
to strict constructionists, having failed to make such a radical change in policy in the 1960's, is [sic]
likelier still not to make it in the years to come."); see also Memorandum from Dorothy Kenyon to the
ACLU Board of Directors, supra note 212, at 1-2 ("A strict construction treatment of the Constitution
on this point would throw us back into the mediaeval days of Blackstone .... Yet it is a strict
construction mood that seems to prevail today.").
214. Memorandum from Pauli Murray & Dorothy Kenyon to the Board of the ACLU, supra note
212.
215. Press Release, ACLU (Oct. 2, 1970) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 3, Folder 12,
on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University). Hartmann shows that the
change in ACLU policy was due not only to external events and to the internal pressures from Murray
and Kenyon, but also to grassroots organization on behalf of the ERA by women in the ACLU's local
affiliates. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 75.
216. Letter from Esther Peterson to Martha Griffiths 1 (Oct. 12, 1971) (Esther Peterson Papers,
MC 450, Box 54, Folder 1061, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University); see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 25, at 289.
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It is difficult for me to make this statement.... [But h]istory is
moving in this direction and I believe women must move with
it. ... My congratulations to you. . . for taking a courageous and
foresighted position. I am happy that I can now share it with you.2 17
In uniting around the ERA, protectionists and equalitarians did not relin-
quish all hope of constitutional change through judicial reinterpretation;
rather, feminists calculated that pursuing improvements in women's legal
status through a constitutional amendment was a goal complementary to
ongoing litigation efforts.
The decision to pursue a dual constitutional strategy was the result of
a long, difficult process of deliberate coalition-building by strategists like
Murray, Eastwood, and others. Equalitarians and protectionists alike had
invested the choice between amendment and judicial reinterpretation with
symbolic and substantive meanings that inhibited the formulation of a co-
herent legal agenda until the late 1960s. Historically grounded negative
preconceptions that linked the ERA with formalism, class privilege, ra-
cism, and disregard for the needs of the average working woman competed
with disdain for the Fourteenth Amendment as an ineffectual tool of pro-
tectionist evasion or a deceptive ploy by activists more concerned with ra-
cial problems than with eradicating sexism. In the end, the historical
affiliations and affinities of certain individuals and groups with one mode
of constitutional change or the other fostered a continuing distrust that may
have discouraged ERA proponents from considering more expansive con-
stitutional agendas. Choices legal feminists made about which methods of
constitutional change to pursue thus had considerable substantive, as well
as strategic, consequences for the shape of the 1970s debate over legal
equality for women, and for the constitutional landscape we encounter to-
day.
II
IMPLEMENTING THE DUAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY:
THE DILEMMAS OF ADVOCACY
Part I recounted the process whereby women's rights leaders over-
came entrenched divisions to unite behind the dual constitutional strategy
during the course of the 1960s. Part II extends the historical narrative into
217. Id. at 1-2. Murray was similarly gracious in a letter to Betty Friedan, mending fences
damaged at the 1967 NOW Conference.
For some time I've meant to drop you a note to tell you how much I appreciate the yeoman
service you have performed in getting the women's movement on the march again. So often
we accept the gifts of one's genius and do not remember to express our gratitude to the
giver .... I'm sorry we rubbed one another the wrong way in the heat of the game .... [I]
just know that if you admire and respect my mind as much as I do yours, we are truly soul
sisters.
Letter from Pauli Murray to Betty Friedan (June 20, 1970) (Betty Friedan Papers, Box 42, Folder 1488,
on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
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the 1970s, exploring the dilemmas feminist legal strategists faced once
they determined to seek both judicial reinterpretation of existing constitu-
tional provisions and an ERA.
The years 1970 and 1971 were momentous ones for the feminist
movement. For the first time, Congress was considering the ERA against a
backdrop of mobilized women's rights agitation, forcing feminists to ar-
ticulate publicly their conception of women's status under the federal
Constitution. Against challenges from both anti-ERA and sympathetic leg-
islators, feminists defended their dual constitutional strategy to the hilt.
Both prongs of their strategy began to bear fruit as legal feminism gained
increasing momentum in Congress and in the courts. Still, the dual strategy
also presented quandaries for advocates whose simultaneous pursuit of two
modes of change quickly became something of a double-edged sword. The
resulting paradoxes, and how feminists dealt with them, is the subject of
this Part.
Part II.A examines the ways in which ERA advocates character-
ized the Fourteenth Amendment's relationship to women's rights and
feminists' prospects for success under existing constitutional provisions.
Part II.B describes feminists' tenacious insistence on preserving their dual
strategy in the face of what they saw as a threat-albeit inadvertent-from
a sympathetic Senator's compromise ERA substitute. Part II.C and Part
II.D discuss the dual strategy in practice, as feminists attempted to exploit
its advantages and avoid its pitfalls. Both were on display in the Supreme
Court's opinions in the first successful women's rights cases under the
Equal Protection Clause, related in Part II.C. Part II.D explores the dilem-
mas of the dual strategy during the 1970s as feminists juggled litigation,
legislation, and the quest for ERA ratification.
A. "If Properly Interpreted": The Fourteenth Amendment
in ERA Advocacy
Choosing between constitutional paths was, in a certain sense, an old
problem for advocates of constitutional change on behalf of women.
Suffragists of the post-Civil-War era had faced a similar set of alterna-
tives: they could, on the one hand, argue that the existing constitution
mandated women's suffrage, or, on the other, that a new amendment was
necessary to guarantee women's right to vote.' 18 But in Minor v.
218. For more on the suffragists' constitutional strategies, see Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the
Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-
1878, 74 J. AM. HIST. 836 (1987); Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the
"'Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 (2001); Rebecca A. Rix, Interpreting Women's
"Privileges" After the Fourteenth Amendment: Ideas, Litigation, and Politics in the "New Departure,"




Happersett (1874),219 the Supreme Court had "resolved" the suffragists'
dilemma for them by denying that the Reconstruction Amendments em-
bodied the principle of sex equality in voting privileges. In the early 1970s,
feminists had no such clear judicial signal to guide them. Hoyt v. Florida220
was almost a decade in the past, and lower courts had signaled some recep-
tivity to the Fourteenth Amendment approach in cases like White v.
Crook."' Furthermore, after both the New Deal and civil rights revolutions
had succeeded in winning constitutional change through judicial reinterpre-
tation rather than textual amendment, the possibilities for a Court turn-
around were more promising than in pre-New Deal eras.222
ERA proponents agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment, if "properly
interpreted," 2 3 protected women from much of the discrimination the ERA
was intended to eliminate.224 The dual strategy, however, created two re-
lated obstacles for them. First, they had to articulate to Congress the need
for an ERA despite the supposed embodiment of sex equality principles in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, they confronted the tactical problem
that courts otherwise inclined to expand the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment might view feminists' promotion of an ERA as evidence that
the existing constitution did not protect women's rights.
To address the first problem, ERA supporters invoked a range of rea-
sons, both pragmatic and symbolic, why Congress should pass the amend-
ment. Many emphasized that the prospects for the Fourteenth Amendment
strategy were uncertain at best, hopeless at worst. Yale Law Professor
Thomas Emerson called "a change by way of judicial interpretation" "not
presently feasible," '25 while Pauli Murray declared in a written statement to
the Senate that the PCSW's litigation strategy had "failed," proof that the
219. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
220. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
221. 251 F. Supp. 401,408 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
222. Earlier efforts to win recognition of women's rights under the Constitution are described by
Jules Lobel as "prophetic" or "aspirational." Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as
Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1995).
223. Equal Rights 1970: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231, Proposing an Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States Relative to Equal Rights for Men and Women, Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 372 (1970) [hereinafter Equal Rights 1970] (statement of
Caruthers Gholsen Berger on behalf of the NWP). Berger continued: "The [Fourteenth] amendment
and [Fifth] amendment's guarantees extend to all persons." Id.
224. Even the NWP joined this consensus. See id. Rep. Martha Griffiths, a longtime ERA
supporter, wrote to her Senate colleagues in 1970: "[AII supporters of [the ERA] agree that the
Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would make the new Amendment redundant." 116 CONG.
REC. 36,863 (1970) (statement of Sen. Bayh (quoting Rep. Griffiths)).
225. Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hearings on H.J. Res. 35, 208, and Related Bills,
Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to Equal Rights for Men and
Women, and H.R. 916 and Related Bills, Concerning the Recommendations of the Presidential Task
Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities, 92d Cong. 400 (1971) [hereinafter Equal Rights for
Men and Women 1971] (statement of Prof. Thomas I. Emerson).
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Court could not be trusted to put things right.226 ERA supporters also em-
phasized the time-consuming, expensive, piecemeal nature of litigation
under existing constitutional provisions which, time and again, had been
subject to unfavorable interpretations in the courts. "[W]hy should
working women like myself have to spend thousands of dollars on
litigation and wait years for a Federal Judge to make up his mind ... [and]
after all this still have to take cases to the Supreme Court[?]" Georgianna
Sellers of the League of American Working Women demanded of the
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1970.227 Talking points prepared for Rep.
Don Edwards (D-CA) stressed the "immense practical difficulties of
remedying the situation by piecemeal action," and cited the testimony of
Professors Emerson, Leo Kanowitz, and Norman Dorsen to this effect.228 In
her congressional testimony, Marguerite Rawalt recounted the long line of
Supreme Court cases rendering the Fourteenth Amendment an ineffectual
weapon against sex discrimination. 2 9 And, while acknowledging that the
Fourteenth Amendment picture was not entirely bleak, given scattered fa-
vorable lower court decisions, Emerson too invoked the "legal deadwood
which must be cleared away before the courts will be prepared to make
clear-cut and rapid progress."230
Not all ERA proponents agreed with this gloomy forecast of the future
of the Fourteenth Amendment strategy, but they nonetheless defended the
need for an ERA. University of New Mexico Law Professor Leo Kanowitz,
author of the 1969 book Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution,
straightforwardly proclaimed his conviction that the Supreme Court would
soon extend the Fourteenth Amendment's full protections to women. In
September 1970, he told the Senate that he believed that "there is a very
high degree of probability that the United States Supreme Court, when it
next confronts an equal protection or due process challenge to a sex dis-
criminatory law, will drastically modify the undifferentiated principle" that
allowed "reasonable" sex-based classifications. 231 Kanowitz recognized the
paradoxical nature of his support for an ERA notwithstanding the likeli-
hood of judicial reinterpretation of existing constitutional provisions, but
he had a justification at the ready: If the Court responded as he hoped and
226. Statement of Pauli Murray on the Equal Rights Amendment (S.J. Res. 61) Submitted to the
Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 16, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 55, Folder 956, on
file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Statement of
Pauli Murray on the Equal Rights Amendment].
227. Id. at 286 (statement of Georgianna Sellers on behalf of the League for American Working
Women).
228. Comments Prepared for Congressman Don Edwards on Statement of Professor Paul Freund
on the Equal Rights Amendment (June 6, 1971) (Thomas Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 26,
Folder: ERA-Congress, on file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University).
229. 116 CONG. REc. 19,349-52 (1970) (statement of Marguerite Rawalt).
230. Equal Rights 1970, supra note 223, at 307 (statement of Thomas I. Emerson).
231. 116 CONG. REC. 31,534 (1970) (statement of Leo Kanowitz).
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believed it would, "no harm will have been achieved by the presence of the
Equal Rights Amendment"; if it did not, "then the need for the Equal
Rights Amendment will have become manifest. 232 Though less optimistic
about the potential for judicial turnaround, Caruthers Gholsen Berger of the
NWP agreed with Kanowitz's win-win scenario. Quoting Justice Joseph
Story's Commentaries, she argued that there was "no reason why
constitutional provisions may not overlap since 'the securities of individual
rights.., cannot be too frequently declared, nor in too many forms of
words' in cases where a tendency has been shown by persons in high
places to ignore such individual rights." '233 In fact, Berger boldly asserted,
"The advocates of equality of rights for women have a right to
simultaneously press for the equal rights amendment and to fight in the
court for the rights of women under the 14th amendment. 234 Indeed, femi-
nists were doing exactly that: as Congress debated the ERA, the ACLU
was helping to prepare the appeal in Reed v. Reed,235 which would reach
the Supreme Court the following year.
Whether or not they forecasted success under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment strategy, ERA supporters all emphasized the ERA's symbolic power
as an emblem of women's legal equality with men. According to propo-
nents across the political spectrum, an ERA had "great symbolic
significance" and would "enhance the self-respect of women, in addition to
the more tangible benefits, 236 would signal a "broad national commitment
that the goal of equal status for women should be quickly and effectively
achieved," '237 and would "help our country to become an example of the
practical ideal that the sole purpose of governments is to create the
conditions under which the uniqueness of each individual is cherished." '238
Pauli Murray used a historical analogy to link the Fourteenth
Amendment and the ERA. Both were necessary, she argued, to guarantee
rights only ambiguously and uncertainly protected by existing constitu-
tional provisions. "There were those members of Congress who were
convinced that the Thirteenth Amendment adequately supported the full
claims of the freed Negroes to citizenship and equal rights," Murray ar-
gued, but "[t]he uncertainty of Congressional authority under the
Thirteenth Amendment ... led to the adoption" of the Fourteenth
232. Id.
233. Equal Rights 1970, supra note 223, at 373 (statement of Caruthers Gholsen Berger on behalf
of the NWP) (alteration in original).
234. Id. at 372.
234. 465 P.2d 635 (Utah 1970).
236. 116 CONG. REC. 29,997 (statement of Sen. Cook).
237. Testimony of Thomas 1. Emerson Before Sub-Committee No. 4 of the House Judiciary
Committee on the Equal Rights Amendment and H.R. 916 and H.R. 4589 (Mar. 1971) (Thomas
Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 26, Folder: ERA-Congress, on file with the Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University).
238. Statement of Pauli Murray on the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 226, at 18.
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Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.239 Similarly, she argued, the uncer-
tainty produced by uneven and mostly discouraging judicial decisions war-
ranted an unambiguous constitutional declaration of women's rights.24°
First and foremost, though, Murray emphasized the substantive and sym-
bolic consequences of the ERA for the group historically most subjugated
by discrimination-African-American women. "[T]he Negro woman,"
Murray told the Senate, "has suffered more than the mere addition of sex
discrimination to race discrimination. She has suffered the conjunction of
these twin immoralities which produced an aggravated condition of
degraded status from which she has not yet recovered.
241
Although ERA advocates marshaled a variety of rationales in support
of the Amendment, arguments about the relative legitimacy of formal
amendment versus judicial reinterpretation surfaced only occasionally,
mostly in the pro-ERA testimony of law professors. One devotee of legal
process did speak in favor of the democratic virtues of constitutional
change through formal amendment. Robert Braucher of Harvard Law
School, a Republican who testified for the ERA on behalf of the Unitarian
Universalist
Association, told Congress that
[j]udicial reform of obsolete laws under the banner of "equal
protection of the laws" is likely to savor of usurpation when the
obsolete law is hallowed by widespread acceptance over a long
period of time [whereas] ... [a] Constitutional Amendment gives
the judges a mandate to which they can respond with confidence
that they are in step with the democratic process.
2 42
Other arguments about the virtues of formal amendment were solely
instrumental. Emerson, himself uninhibited by concerns about judicial
overreaching, invoked the specter of democratic illegitimacy as a reason
why judges were unlikely to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment to
equalitarians' satisfaction. "[T]he Supreme Court has been subjected.., to
powerful attack for moving too fast and too far into frontier areas of the
law," he noted.243 "The Court may consequently be somewhat reluctant to
take the lead in bringing about another major social reform, regardless of
how constitutionally justified that reform may appear to be."2" In another
submission to Congress, Emerson remarked slyly that "[t]hose who
complain that the Supreme Court has been exceeding its powers through
239. Id. at 13.
240. Id. at 13-14.
241. Id. at 5; see also HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 205 (discussing Murray's ERA testimony).
242. Statement of Robert Braucher on behalf of the Unitarian Universalist Association in Support
of the Equal Rights Amendment 3 (Sept. 4, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 123, Folder
2206, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).




interpretation of constitutional provisions should especially welcome the
amending process." '245 To Emerson and many of his feminist allies, the
relative legitimacy of formal textual amendment versus judicial reinterpre-
tation of existing provisions was relevant only in the context of a political
climate that placed a premium on formal constitutional processes and
scorned judicial activism.
In sum, proponents of the ERA invoked judicial intransigence, the
unjust expenditure of resources on litigation, the symbolic significance of a
textual amendment, and in Murray's case, the need to fulfill the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise by affording African-American women genuine
protection from discrimination. When they occasionally mentioned democ-
ratic legitimacy as a justification for preferring textual amendment, it was
usually as an instrumental benefit, given the contemporary climate of judi-
cial conservatism. Moreover, it was nearly always law professors who
raised the legitimacy issue, and even then, for adherents of the dual consti-
tutional strategy, pragmatism was the prevailing determinant of constitu-
tional path.
While many, if not all, ERA proponents offered explanations for the
need to amend the constitutional text despite the Fourteenth Amendment's
concurrent coverage, few faced head-on the second conundrum-signaling
to the courts that the ERA's passage should not be viewed as a barrier to
favorable interpretation of existing constitutional provisions. Professor
Kanowitz did address this dilemma, emphasizing in his testimony that
Congress must "make sure that the record disclose[d]" that the legislature
did not "intend to discourage" the Supreme Court from interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause "so as to eliminate every sex-based discrimination
in American law. 246 There was, Kanowitz recognized, "a very real danger
that if this is not done, the adoption of the Amendment at this time will
ultimately represent a defeat rather than a victory," for the Court was likely
to reason that if Congress "deemed it necessary to adopt the Equal Rights
Amendment, then it must have believed that existing constitutional
provisions were inadequate to provide the needed relief.
'2 47
This strategic concern did not fully surface until Birch Bayh, a mem-
ber of the Judiciary Committee and the primary Senate sponsor of the
ERA, launched a last-ditch effort to push the Amendment through before
Congress adjourned its 1970 session. As the legislators were preparing to
leave for their fall recess, Bayh introduced an amendment in the form of a
substitute to the original ERA legislation, essentially extending the lan-
guage of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause explicitly
245. Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971, supra note 225, at 400 (statement of Thomas I.
Emerson).




to cover discrimination based on sex. The introduction of the Bayh substi-
tute occasioned a more sustained feminist articulation of the relationship
between the Fourteenth Amendment, the ERA, and the constitutional
change legal feminists sought.
B. "New Language Is Required": The Rise and Fall of the Bayh Substitute
As the ERA stalled in the Senate in September 1970, crippled by a
killer school prayer amendment, Senator Birch Bayh sought a compromise
that he hoped would placate both proponents and opponents of the ERA.
The ERA's foes had argued that the amendment would have a variety of
undesirable consequences, some of which seemed to Bayh and several of
his colleagues as if they might be curable through revisions to the amend-
ment's language. For instance, University of Chicago Law Professor Philip
Kurland worried that the ERA's ambiguous meaning would lead to unin-
tended consequences and excessive litigation.24 Harvard Law Professor
Paul Freund, a prominent ERA opponent since the 1940s, also expressed
concern that the ERA would result in "chaos" at all levels of government,
as courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies struggled to determine its
impact on long-standing statutes and regulations.249 Freund invoked a pa-
rade of horribles the ERA might produce, including the legalization of
same-sex marriage, the abolition of husbands' duty of familial support,
unisex bathrooms, and women in military combat.' In doing so, he em-
phasized the amendment's inflexibility, its mandate of absolute equality
that would brook no distinctions based on sex, no matter how firmly rooted
in law, custom, or Freund's conception of common sense. 1
To be sure, changes in wording could not satisfy those ERA oppo-
nents who, like Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, essentially sought to
maintain of traditional sex roles.252 But Bayh and an ideologically diverse
group of his colleagues offered a compromise solution. 3 The Bayh substi-
tute essentially recapitulated the language of the Fourteenth Amendment's
248. Equal Rights 1970, supra note 223, at 87-103 (statement of Philip B. Kurland).
249. Id. at 82 (statement of Paul A. Freund).
249. Id. at 72-86.
251. Id.
252. For an insightful discussion of Ervin's opposition to the ERA, see MATHEWS & DE HART,
supra note 175, at 28-53.
253. Supporters of the Bayh substitute included some longtime ERA proponents and others who
professed allegiance to the cause of equality but had in the past objected to the ERA as a means of
attaining it. Senators Jacob Javits (R-NY), Robert Dole (R-KS), Edward M, Kennedy (D-MA), and
Marlow Cook (R-KY) numbered among those favoring the substitute. The substitute read as follows:
SECTION 1. Neither the United States nor any State shall, on account of sex, deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
SEC. 3. This article shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 264, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. 1970).
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Equal Protection Clause but explicitly applied the provision to discrimina-
tion based on sex. This new version was, in Bayh's own words, "designed
to provide most of the affirmative benefits which are sought by its
sponsors, while meeting the objections of its most articulate critics. '254 The
senators who had supported the ERA, Bayh contended, "had done so
because we believe that the 14th amendment guarantee of equal protection
of the law must be extended to cases involving discrimination on account
of sex., 255 Further, Bayh considered the most persuasive opposing argu-
ments to have been made by Freund and others who worried about the
ERA's lack of flexibility. Declaring that he and many of his colleagues had
always viewed the ERA as a flexible tool whose equality mandate would
give way to "overriding and compelling public interest," Bayh proposed
that this flexibility be memorialized in an amendment that echoed the more
malleable Fourteenth.256
Bayh claimed his substitute amendment would have three benefits.
First, he argued, his version would "make it absolutely clear that the
Congress and the country do not agree with the implication of the Supreme
Court's decisions in this area. 257 Second, the substitute would eliminate
"most, if not all of the few serious remaining statutory discriminations that
would have been eliminated by the equal rights amendment," and would
retain the ERA's "most essential benefit. . . the extraordinary symbolic
value of a national mandate in the area of discrimination on account of
sex." '258 Finally, Bayh contended, the substitute "would clearly prevent the
kind of restrictive interpretation which the critics have feared," because its
recapitulation of the Fourteenth Amendment's language "would
incorporate a vast body of history and judicial precedent," thereby ensuring
"continuity and consistency. 259  According to Bayh, Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence constituted "a coherent and comprehensive
body of law" that would surely be easily transferable to the sex
discrimination context.260
The response from women's organizations to the Bayh substitute was
swift and scathing. Simply applying the Equal Protection Clause to sex
discrimination would hardly ameliorate the ambiguities Bayh wished to
address, feminists argued, since the Fourteenth Amendment was itself the
very source of the judicial uncertainty and inconsistency the ERA was
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meant to obliterate. 261' The substitute "seems nice enough in appearance,"
but "is admittedly intended not to guarantee equality under the law for
women, but to implement and carry out what the opponents of the Equal
Rights Amendment want," complained one widely-circulated critique.262
"We want an amendment that is meaningful, not a watered down and in-
complete version of an existing constitutional amendment.- 263 To add in-
sult to injury, the initial Bayh proposal included only the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, omitting the due process and privi-
leges or immunities guarantees.2 "
Taken somewhat aback by the vehemence of feminist opposition,
Bayh attempted to salvage his substitute by issuing a revised proposal that
included the previously omitted clauses.265 Moreover, in response to con-
cerns that the judiciary would continue to apply a reasonableness standard
to sex-based distinctions, he also assured feminist skeptics that the legisla-
tive history of his substitute would make crystal clear to judges that its ef-
fect was to require strict scrutiny.266 Feminists remained unconvinced,
however. Their deep distrust of judicial proclivities could not so breezily
be put aside. If the Court were confused about the appropriate standard of
261. See, e.g., Letter from Aileen Hemandez to Sen. Birch Bayh (Oct. 30, 1970) (Thomas
Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 25, Folder: ERA-Congress 1970, on file with the Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University); Letter from Alan Reitman to Dorothy Kenyon (Oct. 23, 1970) (Dorothy
Kenyon Papers, Box 29, Folder 1, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College) ("It was
precisely the failure of the Supreme Court to apply the equal protection clause to women which made
us turn to the Equal Rights Amendment as the technique for achieving our policy position.");
Memorandum from Marguerite Rawalt, Re: Status of the Equal Rights Amendment (Nov. 27, 1970)
(Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 95, Folder 1674, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University) ("[The substitute] is unacceptable to proponents [of the ERA] because it
declared that the substitute language of the equal protection clause would 'incorporate a vast body of
history and judicial precedent'-while the existing judicial precedents specifically that 'sex is a valid
classification' for denying equality to women, are precisely [w]hat proponents seek to eradicate, not to
incorporate").
262. Why the Bayh/Kennedy Substitute to the Equal Rights Amendment is Not Satisfactory to
Women 3-4 (Oct. 15, 1970) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-M257, Carton 3, Folder 12, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
263. Id. at 3.
264. See, e.g., Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Alan Reitman (Nov. 2, 1970) (Dorothy Kenyon
Papers, Box 29, Folder 1, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College); Letter from Dr.
Bernice Sandier, Women's Equity Action League, to Sen. Birch Bayh (Oct. 25, 1970) (Mary Eastwood
Papers, 83-M257, Carton 3, Folder 1, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) [hereinafter Letter from Sandier to Bayh] ("The proposed substitute.., implies that the
remainder of the 14th-the due process clause, and the privileges and immunities clause-does not
apply to women.").
265. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Birch Bayh to Bernice Sandier (Oct. 29, 1970) (Pauli Murray
Papers, MC 412, Box 95, Folder 1675, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University) [hereinafter Letter from Bayh to Sandier].
266. Id.
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review or how to apply it, bad decisions might result.267 Moreover, even if
the compelling state interest test were clearly applicable, the Court's his-
tory of sanctioning sex discrimination might lead judges to determine that
the old protectionist justifications did in fact serve such interests.268 "The
words 'equal protection' have already acquired meanings as applied to
women which perpetuate irrelevant distinctions and open the door to
discrimination," Murray wrote to Bayh.269 "To make a break with these
past meanings, new language is required. 27 °
ERA proponents were also concerned about the signal that passage of
a substitute would send to courts. Emerson, for instance, argued that the
fact that a substitute was necessary at all would lead courts to believe that it
was not intended to have the same practical effect as the ERA, while at the
same time giving the judiciary no interpretive guidance. 271' Feminists also
worried about the Bayh substitute's potential effect on the other prong of
their dual strategy-litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reliance
on the Fourteenth Amendment's language would, they feared, effectively
freeze existing judicial interpretation of that amendment rather than open-
ing the way for more expansive readings of its provisions. ACLU attorney
Marvin Karpatkin wrote to Bayh that he feared "the combination of
ambiguous language and an ambiguous legislative history will not only fail
to break down discriminations which have been condoned under the
Fourteenth Amendment in the past but will actually make those
discriminations virtually permanent by elevating them to a constitutional
status.272 Further, the passage of an amendment recapitulating the
Fourteenth would imply that the existing Constitution did not cover sex
discrimination at all. If the substitute were not immediately ratified-or,
even worse, "if the substitute were passed by Congress but not ratified, this
would freeze into being that the [Fourteenth Amendment] does not apply to
women at all, '"273 wrote Bernice Sandler of the Women's Equity Action
League to Bayh.
267. See, e.g., Letter from Ann Corinne Hill, Yale Law Women's Association, to Sen. Birch Bayh
(Nov. 6, 1970) (Thomas Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 25, Folder: ERA-Congress 1970, on file
with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University).
268. Id. at 1-2; Letter from Thomas Emerson to Sen. Birch Bayh 2 (Nov. 6, 1970) (Thomas
Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 25, Folder: ERA-Congress 1970, on file with the Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University) [hereinafter Letter from Emerson to Bayh].
269. Letter from Pauli Murray to Sens. Birch Bayh and Marlow W. Cook 2 (Nov. 8, 1970) (Pauli
Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 95, Folder 1674, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University).
270. Id. Nor would reliance on legislative history provide sufficient clarification of the substitute's
meaning, ERA proponents argued. E.g., Letter from Marvin Karpatkin, ACLU, to Sen. Birch Bayh 2
(Nov. 25, 1970) (Thomas Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 25, Folder: ERA-Congress 1970, on file
with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University) [hereinafter Letter from Karpatkin to Bayh].
271. Letter from Emerson to Bayh, supra note 268, at 2.
272. Letter from Karpatkin to Bayh, supra note 270, at 2.
273. Letter from Sandier to Bayh, supra note 264, at 2.
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Bayh protested that his substitute would do no such thing. In fact, he
contended, the Supreme Court would be even more likely to apply suspect
classification analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment if Congress
passed his measure. "Indeed," he wrote to Sandler, "the Court would often
prefer to rely on some demonstrated government action, as a reflection of
the more fundamental changes in society, in deciding to apply a stricter
standard of review. '274 Despite their appreciation for Bayh's good-faith
effort, women's groups were unmoved by these assurances. On November
11, 1970, feminist organizations issued a joint statement expressing their
unanimous opposition to the Bayh substitute.2 7 5 Less than two years earlier,
Mary Eastwood had observed that "the division in the movement seems to
be so severe" that she doubted "if the various feminist organizations could
work together on anything. '276 Now she wrote triumphantly to Murray:
"I think we have pretty much permanently finished off Bayh's
substitute .... The women's movement really came through fine on this
issue.
277
The defeat of Birch Bayh's substitute in the autumn of 1970 demon-
strated both the newfound unity of the women's movement and legal femi-
nists' strong commitment to the dual constitutional strategy. The Bayh
substitute was unsatisfactory because feminists perceived it-and feared
that courts would view it-as a compromise designed to placate critics of
the ERA. But it also posed a danger to the second prong of feminist consti-
tutional strategy, the continued litigation efforts under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Were the Bayh substitute to succeed, interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment might be frozen in constitutional time, reifying
archaic notions of equal protection rather than expanding the concept of
equal rights to include women and suggesting that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not encompass women's rights at all. In short, the Bayh
substitute compromised the dual strategy from every angle, and in the new
era of feminist unity, it was doomed to defeat from the start.2 78
Vanquishing the Bayh substitute did not mean conquering the dilem-
mas of the dual strategy, however. In fact, the next section demonstrates
274. Letter from Bayh to Sandier, supra note 265, at 2.
275. Eileen Shanahan, Women's Rights Amendment Appears Dead for 1970, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1970, at 19.
276. Letter from Mary Eastwood to Pauli Murray (Jan. 13, 1969) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412,
Box 95, Folder 1657, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
277. Letter from Mary Eastwood to Pauli Murray (Nov. 15, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412,
Box 95, Folder 1657, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(adding that "a 'compromise' version just to win something was so tempting to the less
sophisticated ....") (emphasis added).
278. Mary Frances Berry suggests that the Bayh substitute also "would have created an
opportunity for antagonists to weaken the protection against race discrimination, which no civil rights
proponent cared to do." Mary Frances Berry, Book Review, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 997, 998 (1991)




that as women's rights cases made their way to the Supreme Court for the
first time just as the ERA reached a peak of national attention and support,
the double-edged nature of the dual approach was thrown into sharp relief.
C. "We Have Taken a Baby Step ": The Dual Strategy
in the Supreme Court
When a new Congress convened in 1971, the ERA was once again
before the House, which heard more testimony from many of the same
witnesses who spoke during the previous session. A new face also ap-
peared before the legislators-that of Assistant Attorney General William
H. Rehnquist, presenting the DOJ's assessment of the ERA. Privately,
Rehnquist had expressed his view that the ERA's "overall implication"
was "nothing less than the sharp reduction in importance of the family unit,
with the eventual elimination of that unit by no means improbable. 279 In
an internal administration memorandum, Rehnquist responded to a brief
for the ERA prepared for the CACSW by Mary Eastwood,2"' then his
subordinate in the DOJ. Rehnquist's memo warned of the ERA's possibly
dire consequences-consequences that threatened to transform "holy
wedlock" into "holy deadlock."28' Nearly all invidious discriminations
against women had already been eliminated, Rehnquist argued; the ERA
would merely eliminate the legal protections women had long enjoyed.282
He opined that while "[u]ndoubtedly many of the supporters of the equal
rights for women amendment have rationally and carefully considered
these questions," he could "[]not help thinking that there is also present
somewhere in this movement a virtually fanatical desire to obscure not
only legal differentiation between men and women, but insofar as possible,
physical distinctions between the sexes." '28 3 In feminism, Rehnquist saw
"overtones of dislike and distaste for the traditional difference between
men and women in the family unit, and in some cases very probably a
complete rejection of women's traditionally different role in this regard." '284
279. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, DOJ, to Leonard Garment, Special Counsel to the President (1970), reprinted in LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1986, at 4, 5 [hereinafter Memorandum from Rehnquist to Garment]. Rehnquist's
memo detailing arguments against the ERA was exhumed by opponents of his nomination to become
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1986.
280. Eastwood prepared her memorandum with Rehnquist's permission. Letter from Jacqueline
Gutwillig, Chairman, CACSW, to William Rehnquist (Jan. 14, 1970) (Mary Eastwood Papers, 83-
M257, Carton 1, Folder 6, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)
(requesting Eastwood's participation, with handwritten note from "Bill R." to "Mary" granting
permission).
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The administration, Rehnquist wrote, should not "support a change which
will in fact hasten the dissolution of the family." '285
In his statements to Congress, Rehnquist voiced additional hesitations
about the ERA. Nominally, the DOJ supported the amendment, but overall,
feminists viewed Rehnquist's testimony as, at best, damning with faint
praise. There was "no denying," Rehnquist testified, "that opponents of
th[e] amendment have raised significant questions which deserve the
serious consideration of the [House Judiciary C]ommittee." '286 He warned
that the "broad general language" of the ERA would "add substantial
uncertainties in this area of constitutional law which would probably
require extensive and protracted litigation to dispel." '287 Furthermore,
Rehnquist argued, the Supreme Court was soon likely to move in a liberal-
izing direction with respect to sex discrimination claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment.288
Rehnquist testified in April 1971. In October, the House passed the
ERA, stripped of all qualifying exceptions and amendments, by the wide
margin of 354 to 23. Nine days later, President Nixon nominated Rehnquist
to fill Justice John Marshall Harlan's seat on the United States Supreme
Court. Just one month later in Reed v. Reed, the Court, for the first time
ever, invoked the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee to
unanimously strike down a law discriminating against women-a recently
repealed Idaho statute preferring male estate administrators to females.289
Reed was a state court case plucked out of obscurity by feminists who
sought Supreme Court resolution of the proper standard of review for sex-
discriminatory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. ACLU Legal
Director Melvin Wulf enlisted the help of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, law pro-
fessor and budding women's rights expert, to draft the appellant's brief to
the Supreme Court.29° In that brief, Ginsburg and her colleagues built upon
the previous work of Pauli Murray and Dorothy Kenyon (both of whom
were credited as the briefs coauthors) to argue not only that the distinction
between male and female estate administrators that had favored Sally
Reed's husband at her expense was unreasonable, but also that all
285. Id. at 5.




289. 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). Rehnquist was not sworn in until January 1972, and so did not
participate in the Reed decision.
290. See, e.g., Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Melvin Wulf (Mar. 2, 1971) (ACLU Records,
Box 1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University)
(requesting information about the case); Letter from Melvin Wulf to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Mar. 9,
1971) (ACLU Records, Box 1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library,
Princeton University) [hereinafter Letter from Wulfto Ginsburg] (requesting Ginsburg's assistance).
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sex-based legal distinctions were, like race-based distinctions, inherently
suspect.29'
The ACLU attorneys saw Reed as a golden opportunity to impress
upon the Court the inherent injustice of sex-based legal classifications.
Wulf was particularly adamant that Reed's significance went far beyond
Idaho's refusal to consider Sally Reed and her husband as equally capable
of administering their deceased son's small estate. He browbeat amici who
did not prioritize the argument for strict scrutiny of sex-based classifica-
tions over the contention that this particular classification was unreason-
able enough to fail even rational basis review.2 92 Wulf also attempted,
unsuccessfully, to wrest the case away from Allen Derr, Sally Reed's per-
sonal attorney, and to draft former ACLU attorney Eleanor Holmes Norton
to argue the case before the Supreme Court.293 The ACLU had devoted
considerable resources to writing the widely praised brief for Mrs. Reed,
which, as the "grandmother brief," would serve as a template for future
Supreme Court submissions in sex discrimination cases. Wulf shuddered at
the possibility that someone he perceived as an inexperienced lawyer with
little knowledge of the constitutional issues at stake would botch the oral
presentation of Reed to the Court.
291. Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
292. Wulf wrote one amici:
Our brief argued firstly and predominantly that sex should be denominated as 'suspect.' Our
second point is that the classification is irrational. Your brief reverses those positions. Thus,
to the extent that your brief will have any influence at all with the Court, it will injure our
position. Such favors I don't need.
Letter from Melvin Wulf to Norman Redlich, Office of Corporation Counsel 1 (July 1, 1971) (ACLU
Records, Box 1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton
University).
293. Wulf attempted to persuade Derr that because of the inability of the plaintiffs' male attorney
in a recent employment discrimination case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), to
fend off the "locker-room humor" of the justices, and because of the symbolic value of having a female
attorney argue the first constitutional sex discrimination case to reach the Court in a decade, Derr
should allow a woman to argue Reed. Wulf also attempted to enlist the help of longtime feminists such
as Rep. Martha Griffiths and NOW president Wilma Scott Heide to convince Sally Reed to authorize a
more experienced attorney to handle the oral argument. Derr declined to respond to Wulf's increasingly
insistent letters until it was too late to ask the Court to allow a split argument. See Letter from Wulf to
Ginsburg, supra note 290 (announcing intention to "fight off my co-counsel in Idaho"); Letter from
Melvin L. Wulf to Allen R. Derr (June 4, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box 1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on
file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University) (suggesting that for both symbolic and
pragmatic reasons, the Reed case should be argued by a woman); Letter from Melvin L. Wulf to Allen
R. Derr (Oct. 8, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box 1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University) (excoriating Derr for allowing his "ego satisfaction" to get in
the way of a competent Supreme Court argument in Reed); Letter from Melvin L. Wulf to Allen R.
Derr (Dec. 20, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box 1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University) (blaming Derr for the Court's "bland and very narrow
opinion"); Telegram from Allen R. Derr to Melvin L. Wulf (Dec. 26, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box
1645, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University) ("My
client and I are sorry we allowed your help in the case of Reed versus Reed.").
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At oral argument, Wulf s fears were realized. He wrote to Derr that
the Idaho lawyer's performance "fulfilled my worst expectations. The
argument," Wulf declared, "may have been one of the worst in the history
of the Supreme Court. ' 294 He nevertheless predicted victory, which came in
November in a unanimous, but rather cryptic, ruling authored by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger. The Court declared Idaho's preference for male
estate administrators to be "arbitrary," but did not disturb the
"reasonableness" standard for evaluating sex-based classifications under
the equal protection clause. 95 Wulf blamed Derr's inexpert argument for
the Court's "bland and very narrow opinion, ' 296 and emphasized to the na-
tional press that the Court had not fulfilled his hopes for a broader, more
expansive decision.297
Many feminists agreed that Reed was less than a clear-cut victory.
Having remarked several months earlier that she would "resign from the
human race" if Mrs. Reed lost her case,29 Rep. Martha Griffiths now pre-
dicted that the Court would remain a "'bottleneck' for women's rights.
299
Senator Sam Ervin seized on the decision as proof that an ERA was unnec-
essary,"° but feminists heartily disagreed. In fact, they argued, the very
narrowness and vagueness of the Reed decision made the need for an ERA
all the more stark. Women's Bureau director Elizabeth Duncan Koontz
noted that "analysis of the decision indicates that the need for a
constitutional amendment is as compelling as ever." '' A Washington Post
editorial agreed, asserting that Reed was decided "on the narrowest
possible grounds," and did not "in any way diminish the need for the
constitutional amendment."302
Pauli Murray expressed her persistent qualms about the likelihood of
a judicial overhaul of sex discrimination jurisprudence to Mary Dublin
Keyserling, one of the few remaining protectionist holdouts from the 1960s
Women's Bureau coalition. In December, Murray wrote Keyserling of her
disappointment at the Court's failure to accept the suspect classification
294. Letter from Melvin L. Wulf to Allen R. Derr (Oct. 21, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box 1645,
Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
294. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
296. Letter from Melvin L. Wulf to Allen R. Derr (Dec. 20, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box 1645,
Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
297. Court Rules Out Bias By Legislators, Associated Press, Nov. 23, 1971 (ACLU Records, Box
1646, Folder: Reed v. Reed, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University) (quoting
Wulf s statement that he was "moderately pleased that we won the case, but the pleasure is very
qualified because we did not win on the broader grounds").
298. Letter from Rep. Martha Griffiths to Melvin L. Wulf (July 6, 1971) (ACLU Records, Box
1645, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
299. See GRAHAM, supra note 90, at 418.
300. Court Rules Out Bias By Legislators, supra note 297 (quoting Sen. Sam Ervin).
301. Letter from Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor (Dec. 1971)
(ACLU Records, Box 1146, Folder 6, on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University).
302. Editorial, Sex and the Single Administratrix, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1971, at A20.
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argument, and emphasized that the Reed decision had deepened her convic-
tion that an ERA was not "less preferable than a case-by-case approach. 3 3
Murray was hopeful that "[t]he pressure for ERA may force the Court to
take the additional steps," but "what with a possible Renquist [sic] on the
Court... I shudder to think what the Court might do. Anyway, we have
taken a baby step.""a
In March 1972, the Senate approved the ERA and sent it to the states
for consideration. Ten months later, Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the sec-
ond major women's rights case of the decade, Frontiero v. Richardson, 5
before the Supreme Court, in her capacity as head of the newly created
ACLU Women's Rights Project (WRP). °6 The advantages and pitfalls of
the dual strategy were on display in the Court's opinions, issued in May.
For Justice Brennan, who wrote a plurality opinion endorsing strict scru-
tiny for sex-based classifications, congressional passage of the ERA
weighed in support of judicial reinterpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The ERA's passage indicated to him that "Congress itself has
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious."307
Brennan opined that "this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is
not without significance to the question presently under consideration.""3 8
Brennan's assessment would have become law had one more Justice
joined the plurality. Instead, Justice Stewart concurred in the plurality's
judgment only, while Justice Powell wrote a concurrence, joined by Burger
and Blackmun, arguing that the ERA's pendency militated against, rather
than in favor of, a more expansive interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Powell deemed the ratification process a "compelling... reason
for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the
strictest test of judicial scrutiny.""3 9 He continued:
By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has
assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state
303. Letter from Pauli Murray to Mary Dublin Keyserling 1 (Dec. 7, 1971) (Pauli Murray Papers,
MC 412, Box 95, Folder 1657, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University).
304. Id. at 1-2.
305. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
306. The WRP was officially created in March 1972. HARTMANN, supra note 25, at 82. For more
on the early years of the WRP, see Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An
Examination of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM.
HuM. RTs. L. REV. 373 (1976).
307. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
308. Id. at 687-88. Mark Tushnet views Brennan's articulation of the ERA's relevance in
Frontiero as a quintessential example of his "majoritarian egalitarianism." Mark Tushnet, Justice
Brennan, Equality, and Majority Rule, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1357, 1357, 1361-62 (1991). For more on
the influence of congressional determinations on judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions,
see Post & Siegel, Legislative Consitutionalism, supra note 5; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection by Law,
supra note 5.
309. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
2004]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process,
are debating the proposed [Equal Rights] Amendment. It seems to
me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major
political decision which is currently in process of resolution does
not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative
processes.31°
In a memorandum to Brennan, Justice Blackmun made a similar argu-
ment: "It seems to me that Reed v. Reed is ample precedent here and is all
we need and that we should not, by this case, enter the arena of the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment.""31
Brennan valiantly attempted to dissuade his colleagues from this posi-
tion and win their adherence to his pathbreaking opinion. He gave two
primary reasons for disagreeing with Powell's assessment. First, he cited
Justice Marshall's dissent in the recent San Antonio v. Rodriguez decision,
which had persuaded Brennan that the only coherent rationale for Reed
involved the designation of sex as a suspect classification.3"' Second,
Brennan observed, the Court could "[n]ot count on the Equal Rights
Amendment to make the equal protection issue go away." '3 13 Presciently, he
predicted it was unlikely that a sufficient number of states would ratify the
Amendment, but he argued that "whether or not the Equal Rights
Amendment eventually is ratified, we cannot ignore the fact that Congress
and the legislatures of more than half the States have already determined
that classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect." '3 14 Regardless of
whether ERA enjoyed enough support to become part of the Constitution,
Brennan suggested, its successes to date warranted the Court's reinterpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
310. Id. Powell wrote the following in a memorandum to Brennan explaining why he could not
join Brennan's opinion:
My principal concern about going this far at this time, as indicated in my earlier letter, is that
it places the Court in the position of preempting the amendatory process initiated by the
Congress. If the Equal Rights Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of the
people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, this
Court puts 'sex' in the same category as 'race' we will have assumed a decisional
responsibility (not within the democratic process) unnecessary to the decision of this case,
and at the very time that legislatures around the country are debating the genuine pros and
cons of how far it is wise, fair and prudent to subject both sexes to identical responsibilities as
well as rights.
Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. I (Mar. 2, 1973)
(William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Part 1:299, Folder 11, on file with the Library of Congress).
311. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. I (Mar. 5,
1973) (William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Part 1:299, Folder 11, on file with the Library of Congress).
312. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice Lewis F. Powell (Mar. 6, 1973)
(William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Part 1:299, Folder 11, on file with the Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Brennan to Powell] ("Thurgood's discussion of Reed in his dissent to
your [decision in San Antonio v.] Rodriguez convinces me that the only rational explication of Reed is





Frontiero signified a partial victory for the dual constitutional strat-
egy. Brennan's opinion-and indeed the temporal proximity of judicial
reinterpretation with congressional approval of the ERA-suggests that
without the impetus provided by ERA advocacy, feminist litigation might
not have succeeded to the extent that it did. But as Justice Powell's concur-
rence vividly demonstrated, the simultaneous pursuit of the ERA cut both
ways. More cautious justices were unwilling to circumvent Article V proc-
esses and prematurely declare sex equality. Justice Rehnquist, who as a
DOJ official had equivocated about the ERA's desirability and predicted
judicial reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, declined to partici-
pate in that reinterpretation, making him the lone dissenter in Frontiero.1 5
Having come up one justice short of establishing strict scrutiny as the
standard of review for sex-based classifications, legal feminists renewed
their commitment to the dual constitutional strategy. The failure to achieve
a majority in Frontiero indicated that they could not count on the Court for
an unequivocal endorsement of egalitarian principles; over the next several
years, dogged ratification battles in recalcitrant states would reveal that the
ERA was no less susceptible to the slings and arrows of political fortune.
No longer crippled by internal dissension over the ERA as they had been in
the 1960s, legal feminists of the 1970s could afford to be pragmatists. For
better or for worse, they would pursue the dual strategy until the ERA's
final demise in 1982.
D. "What Harm Redundance? " Advantages and Pitfalls
of the Dual Strategy
When Dorothy Kenyon endorsed the dual strategy after decades of
opposition to the ERA, she remarked that surely no harm could come from
simultaneously pursuing Fourteenth Amendment litigation and a new
amendment. "[I]f the new Amendment could act as a catalyst in getting
clarification [through litigation] ... it too would be a blessing. Needless to
say the Amendment (with the XIVth in its present condition) cannot be
called unnecessary; and, even if it became so later, what harm
redundance? 31' In contrast, ERA post-mortems by historians and political
scientists place significant blame for the amendment's ratification failure
on the success of efforts to achieve judicial reinterpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 7 The gap between legal feminists' confident ar-
ticulation of the dual strategy in the early 1970s and these retrospective
315. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relying on the
reasoning of the district court, see Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972), which found
a reasonable basis for the challenged military benefits laws).
316. Dorothy Kenyon, The Equal Rights Amendment 5 (n.d.) (unpublished draft of encyclopedia
entry) (Dorothy Kenyon Papers, Box 23, Folder 17, on file with the Sophia Smith Collection, Smith
College).
317. See, e.g., BERRY, supra note 9, at 99-100; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 9, at 48-59.
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evaluations of its effects on the ERA's prospects for ratification raises
questions about the soundness of this strategy. This section examines how
feminist lawyers grappled with the emerging dilemmas of the dual strategy
throughout the remainder of the 1970s.
Initially, most feminists likely believed that the dual constitutional
approach would be only a temporary expedient, not a long-term strategy.
As many scholars of the ERA have noted, proponents utterly failed to an-
ticipate the strength of the opposition they would face during the ratifica-
tion process, in part because the STOP ERA campaign spearheaded by
Phyllis Schlafly did not mobilize in full force until the 1973 Roe v. Wade
decision galvanized anti-feminists." 8 At the same time, legal feminists did
not believe that a ratified ERA would end the need for litigation altogether;
rather, they envisioned seeking further clarification of women's rights in
the courts under the new amendment instead of under existing constitu-
tional provisions.31 9 Once it became evident that the ratification battle
would be of protracted duration and uncertain outcome, feminist legal
strategists had to contend with the dilemmas their dual strategy
precipitated.
Feminist lawyers and activists attempting to implement the dual con-
stitutional strategy faced three primary conundrums. The first, described in
the preceding section, involved the reluctance of some justices to circum-
vent the Article V process and effectively enact the ERA through reinter-
pretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Feminists could and did continue
to invoke the ERA's passage as an example of a congressional enactment
that, like the Civil Rights Amendments of 1972, reflected a broad national
consensus in favor of sex equality. However, the existence of an unratified
constitutional amendment that would enact the change legal feminists
sought raised important-and, in wake of Powell's Frontiero concurrence,
unavoidable--questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability. Ruth
Bader Ginsburg frequently attempted to turn the justices' reluctance to
feminists' advantage by arguing that only an ERA would resolve the equal-
ity question in an unambiguous manner. In a 1976 speech, she explained
the difficulties of relying solely on doctrinal development to achieve femi-
nists' goals: "The Court must act with particular circumspection ... in the
dim zone between constitutional interpretation (a proper judicial task) and
318. See, e.g., David E. Kyvig, Historical Misunderstandings and the Defeat of the Equal Rights
Amendment, 18 PUB. HISTORIAN 45, 52-53 (1996).
319. See, e.g., Kenyon, supra note 316; Testimony of Thomas 1. Emerson on Ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 11 (June 7, 1977) (Thomas Emerson Papers, 92-M-
56, Box 24, Folder: ERA--Current Basic Materials, file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale
University) [hereinafter Testimony of Emerson on Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment] ("The
role of the courts in applying the Equal Rights Amendment will be no different than their function with
respect to due process, equal protection, the First Amendment, or any other basic provision of the




constitutional amendment (a job for federal and state legislatures). 3 20
Since the legislative history of the Civil War amendments admittedly sug-
gested the Framers' indifference to sex equality, Ginsburg argued, the only
gesture that would remove this historical impediment for all time was the
enactment of an ERA.32'
Ginsburg's argument for an ERA as a "signal"3 22 to courts that seemed
to flounder in their attempts to enunciate a coherent constitutional principle
was also responsive to legal feminists' second dilemma-how to continue
to assert the ERA's necessity in spite of very real accomplishments in the
litigation arena. One obvious solution was to emphasize the justices' am-
bivalence, inconsistency, and incoherence in addressing sex discrimination
questions. In 1975, after a confusing and cryptic series of decisions left
utterly ambiguous the Court's rationale for upholding some sex distinctions
and not others, Ginsburg lamented, "Without ERA, I don't think we will
see from this Supreme Court an articulated advance in theory." '323 Legal
feminists did their best to turn court defeats into ERA victories. John H.
Fleming, a sympathetic Harvard Law Review editor, wrote to Ginsburg
that same year that the Court's recent unfavorable decisions in Schlesinger
v. Ballard324 and Kahn v. Shevin325 "at least have the merit of underscoring
the need for the E.R.A." '326 When the Supreme Court declared in Geduldig
v. Aiello3 27 that the Equal Protection Clause had nothing to say about dis-
crimination based on pregnancy, Thomas Emerson boldly told the
Connecticut General Assembly, which was considering rescission of the
ERA, that "[w]hatever hope there may once have been of achieving equal
rights for women through interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
must now plainly be abandoned.
3 2t
320. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speech to the ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
The American Woman-200 Years Later 8-9 (Aug. 10, 1976) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container
20, Folder: Equal Rights Amend.: American Bar Association, 1973-1980, on file with the Library of
Congress).
321. Jd. at 10-11.
322. Ruth B. Ginsburg & Kathleen W. Peratis, Editorial, Equal Rights for Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1975, at 21 ("A clear signal, a counterpart to the one supplied for race by the 14th amendment,
is needed to assure replacement of ad hoc decision-making by a coherent opinion pattern. The E.R.A.
would supply that signal."); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Let's Have E.R.A. as a Signal, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1977, at 70 (making same argument); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: A LIFETIME GUARANTEE (1976) (same).
323. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Catherine East (Mar. 31, 1975) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, Container 7, Folder: Stevenson v. Castles: Correspondence, Jan.-Apr. 1975, on file with the
Library of Congress).
324. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
325. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
326. Letter from John H. Fleming to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Jan. 18, 1975) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, Container 4, Folder: Kahn v. Shevin, 1973-1975, on file with the Library of Congress).
327. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
328. Statement of Thomas I. Emerson Before the Government Administration and Policy
Committees of the Connecticut General Assembly on Proposed Resolution to Rescind Connecticut's
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This tactic-labeling the litigation route as hopeless-created a third
predicament for feminists. While the cause of ERA advocacy might best be
served by harshly criticizing the Court's equal protection jurisprudence,
undermining the existing favorable precedents seemed unwise given the
ERA's uncertain fate. Ginsburg recognized this problem early on and cau-
tioned the Women's Rights Law Reporter in 1972 against publishing a cri-
tique of Reed that implied that the decision upheld old unfavorable
precedents.3 29 Ginsburg argued that "[o]ne can support ERA with utmost
vigor ... without resorting to a broadside that is not only inaccurate but
also harmful in cases now pending.""33 Since the ERA was, in her estima-
tion, "3, maybe 4 years away from becoming effective ... statements that
Reed upholds old precedents.., could be turned against women who seek
relief now. ' 33 1 Citing lower court cases in which "the affirmative [aspects
of Reed were] emphasized," Ginsburg indicated that she was committed to
"using Reed for whatever positive value it can yield in pending
litigation. '332 The juxtaposition of litigation tactics with ERA rhetoric con-
tained an element of contradiction. Five years later, Fleming astutely ob-
served in a letter to Ginsburg, "I note with bemusement how we both stress
the consistencies and groundbreaking nature of recent Supreme Court
equal protection decisions when arguing equal protection cases ... and
find the same law to be in a thorough state of confusion when we speak to
the need for an ERA. 333
When faced with skepticism on this point, feminists reminded critics
that the ERA's legislative history revealed a common impression that ex-
isting constitutional provisions, if properly interpreted, would yield the
same result as an amendment. In a 1972 court brief, the ACLU quoted one
senator as stating the "general view" that "[i]f courts were to move forward
with regard to interpreting the fourteenth amendment to afford true equal
protection for women, the new amendment could be redundant. '34 In her
notes for oral argument before the Supreme Court in the 1976 case
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (Mar. 1977) (Thomas Emerson Papers, 92-M-56, Box 24,
Folder: ERA: Current Basic Materials, on file with the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University);
see also Testimony of Emerson on Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 319, at 9
("One can only conclude that resort to the Supreme Court is a lost hope.").
329. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Elizabeth Langer, Women's Rights Law Reporter (Apr.
14, 1972) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 7, Folder: Reed v. Reed, 1972-1975, on file with
the Library of Congress).
330. Id. at 1.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Letter from John H. Fleming, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP, to Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(Sept. 2, 1977) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 1, Folder: Equal Rights Amend.: American
Bar Association, 1973-1980, on file with the Library of Congress).
334. Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU, Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 295 A.2d 223 (Md.
1972) (No. 105), available at NOW LDEF Papers, 95-M79, Carton 5, Folder: TVll-Stevenson v.
Castles, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.
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Califano v. Goldfarb, Ginsburg wrote: "In Congress, ERA proponents as
well as opponents shared the view that clarification of the [equal protection
provision's] application to s[ex]-b[ased] discrimination was needed and
should come from this Court... Proponents believed appropriate jud[icial]
interp[retation of the] 5[th] and 14[th amendments] would secure equal
rights for men and women." '335 In effect, she was arguing to the justices that
the dual strategy was not clumsy or inconsistent, but an intentional and
well-considered approach, and that even advocates committed to change
through formal amendment had only resorted to such drastic measures be-
cause of misguided judicial intransigence that the Court had begun to
remedy. The Court, she suggested, could continue this process of redemp-
tion without thwarting normal Article V procedures.
As Ginsburg's oral argument strategy indicates, the impact of the dual
approach on feminists' legal fortunes during this decade was neither
wholly negative nor strictly limited to effects on the ERA's chances for
ratification. As Reva Siegel has argued, the social movement mobilizations
that accompany many attempts at constitutional emendation do not
automatically lose their legal and constitutional significance when they fail
Article V's ratification test.336 Brennan's opinion in Frontiero suggests that
as many as four justices believed that congressional approval of the ERA
was a factor militating in favor of-not against-judicial reinterpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Had feminists not pursued litigation under
the Fourteenth Amendment and had the ERA still failed, they might have
relinquished all prospect of progress toward a constitutional sex equality
norm. For all of its flaws, the dual strategy succeeded in preventing the
legal arm of the women's movement from placing all of its eggs in one
fragile constitutional basket.
III
LEGAL FEMINISM'S CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY
Legal feminists' coalescence around the dual constitutional approach
had profound and immediate substantive and strategic consequences, as
Parts I and II have shown. Part III assesses the dual strategy's legacy, look-
ing first at the paradoxical results of legal feminists' pragmatic approach to
constitutional change, before turning to its resonances in current constitu-
tional sex equality doctrine. The final section briefly suggests how this his-
torical example may shed light on the constitutional choices facing
advocates today.
335. ERA Notes (Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 2, Folder: Califano v. Goldfarb, Oral
Argument Notes and Related Material, 1976, on file with the Library of Congress).
336. Siegel, supra note 5. For an argument that the mode of constitutional change has proven
irrelevant to long-term interpretive outcomes, see David Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001).
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A. The Paradoxes of Pragmatism
Legal feminists' constitutional choices left a mixed legacy, both for
constitutional sex equality jurisprudence and for the feminist movement
itself. The dual strategy was, essentially, a pragmatic solution to the two
problems legal feminists confronted in the 1960s: internal dissension and
judicial intransigence. Once Murray and her allies convinced their compa-
triots, after years of careful diplomacy, that the Fourteenth Amendment and
the ERA were complementary tools of change, the dual strategy united ad-
vocates who had for years labored separately and antagonistically. Indeed,
the legal feminists' concerted effort to scuttle Senator Bayh's compromise
proposal in 1970 demonstrated the degree to which once-reluctant indi-
viduals and organizations were committed to the dual strategy. This trans-
formation of the dual strategy from expedient tactic to mobilizing tool
reflected an intuition that attacking sex discrimination on multiple fronts
offered greater chances for success than pinning legal feminists' hopes on
formal amendment or judicial reinterpretation alone.
Both of these pragmatic rationales for uniting around a dual strategy
led to somewhat paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, this historical
account leaves no doubt of the centrality of intersectional perspectives to
the development of American legal feminism. For Pauli Murray, the cham-
pion of a strategic approach to change, constitutional choices had profound
consequences for the viability of interracial coalitions with the capacity to
recognize the multiplicity of women's identities. Caught between a racial
justice movement that often marginalized women and a legal feminism
founded on racial exclusion, Murray and her allies forged a constitutional
coalition capable of transcending decades of disunity and in no small part
responsible for feminist coalescence around the dual strategy.
In the end, however, though reaching this consensus required jettison-
ing old feminist alliances with segregationists, convergence around the
dual strategy ultimately meant losing the Fourteenth Amendment's inter-
sectional promise and retaining the ERA's old, formalistic language and
detachment from other forms of inequality, from reproductive rights, and
from private discrimination. For her part, Murray never relinquished her
hope that the Constitution would incorporate an expansive and inclusive
affirmation of equality for all Americans, even after she left the law in the
mid-1970s to become one of the first female clergy in the Episcopal
Church. In her inaugural sermon as an ordained priest, delivered in 1977 in
the North Carolina church where her enslaved great-grandmother had been
baptized more than a century earlier, Murray offered a prayer for the
speedy passage of the ERA in her state's legislature.33 7 When the ERA
went down to defeat several years later, Murray proposed to NOW leaders
337. 1st Negro Woman Priest Holds Service in N.C., WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1977, at D14.
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a new Human Rights Amendment that would encompass all
"'downtrodden, weak and subordinate' groups" so that "all minorities
could come together in a coalition," and overcome feminism's persistent
image as dominated by the interests of white, middle-class women.338
At seventy-three, Murray was still strategizing, but the time for amendment
had come and gone.
In yet another paradox, the dual strategy had appealed to Fourteenth
Amendment partisans precisely because a Nixonian Court seemed less
likely to engage in a progressive reinterpretation of existing constitutional
provisions, rendering an ERA necessary. But the very political impulse that
counseled judicial restraint in an increasingly conservative climate sapped
strength from the dual strategy, a weakness the Frontiero impasse soon
exposed. Pursuing a dual strategy had the salutary effect of convincing the
Court to embrace a heightened standard of review for sex-based classifica-
tions, but also provided a justification for stopping short of the strict scru-
tiny legal feminists sought. Legal feminists had the misfortune of reaching
their political peak at the very moment that possibilities for social change
through legal reform were constricting across the board. Nor did the old
problem-women's inability to claim the "discrete and insular minority"
status that justified judicial intervention on behalf of politically disadvan-
taged groups--disappear. Indeed, advocates like Ginsburg, the most
prominent implementer of the dual strategy, were acutely aware of this di-
lemma.339
Notably, legal feminists' constitutional choices were not, in the first
instance, driven by the considerations courts tend to privilege as indicia of
the democratic legitimacy of change. As they formulated their strategy in
the 1960s, feminists were preoccupied with negotiating the personal and
political loyalties and prejudices that had long prevented a concerted effort
to improve women's legal status. Once they finally agreed upon the dual
strategy and presented it to Congress during the ERA debates, arguments
about legitimacy rarely surfaced except in the testimony of law professors,
relative latecomers to the legal feminist camp. This disjuncture between
338. Letter from Pauli Murray to Judy Goldsmith 1 (Nov. 30, 1983) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC
412, Box 125, Folder 2248, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University); see also Memorandum from Pauli Murray to Judith Goldsmith, Gloria Steinem, Marjorie
Fine Knowles, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Marguerie Rawalt, Sonia Pressman Fuentes, Catherine East,
Carolina F. Ware, Ann Fagan Ginger, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Betty Friedan, Mary 0. Eastwood, Kay
Clarenbach, Re: A Proposed Human Rights Amendment to Replace the Campaign for ERA (Nov. 30,
1983) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 125, Folder 2248, on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
339. Ginsburg's training in the law at the height of the legal process school's influence likely
made her particularly cognizant of such difficulties. Ginsburg was a student of Herbert Wechsler's at
Columbia Law School in the 1950s, see Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at C21, having previously studied with Henry Hart and Albert Sacks at
Harvard, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword.- Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27,27 (1994).
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courts' and advocates' conception of the relationship between political ac-
tion and the legitimacy of judicial reinterpretation of constitutional mean-
ings may not be surprising, but it is revealing. If decisions about which
modes of change to pursue are not based upon calculations about their rela-
tive legitimacy, and if formal amendment advocacy and litigation are not
independent but rather are deeply intertwined, then assessments of which
mode of change has the superior democratic pedigree must take into ac-
count advocates' constitutional choices and their consequences.
B. The Dual Strategy's Legacies in Constitutional
Sex Equality Jurisprudence
The paradoxes described in the preceding section echo through consti-
tutional sex equality jurisprudence to this day. The mercurial intermediate
scrutiny standard is perhaps our most prominent souvenir of legal femi-
nism's partial triumph. This Goldilocks solution, enshrined in Craig v.
Boren,340 elaborated and arguably strengthened in subsequent cases culmi-
nating in United States v. Virginia,34' captures the Court's ambivalence
about both the procedural and the substantive aspects of a revolution in
gender roles. The limitations of intermediate scrutiny were on display in
Nguyen v. INS,342 in which the Court upheld a requirement that children
born of American fathers and non-American mothers provide affirmative
evidence of paternity not required of children born of American mothers
and non-American fathers. Legal feminism's legacy is also visible in the
Court's decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,343 a
startling affirmation of congressional power under Section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Family Medical Leave Act. The dual
strategy has thus contributed both to the sea change in sex discrimination
jurisprudence that heightened scrutiny represented and to the limitations of
that transformation.
1. Vindication: United States v. Virginia
It is difficult to overestimate the distance between the conception of
gender roles articulated in the 1961 case Hoyt v. Florida and the new sex
discrimination jurisprudence inaugurated in Reed and Frontiero in the
early 1970s. The decision in Hoyt, which upheld Florida's exemption of
women from compulsory jury service, was not the work of political reac-
tionaries-indeed, the unanimous Court included Justices Brennan, Black,
Douglas, Warren, and Stewart. For Hoyt's author, Justice Harlan, excepting
women from the civic obligation of jury service flowed naturally from the
340. 429 U.S. 190(1976).
341. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
342. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
343. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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assumption that women's essential social location had always been and
would always be "at the center of home and family life. 34 4 Hoyt also logi-
cally followed the Court's twentieth-century solicitude for sex-based pro-
tective labor laws, designed to shield working women from exploitation
and preserve their ability to care for their families. The assumptions that
women, but not men, were responsible for caretaking duties in the home-
and that men, but not women, should bear the burden of familial financial
support-were the target of women's rights advocates by the 1970s. It was
these assumptions that Ginsburg and her colleagues sought to eradicate
through challenges to laws that asymmetrically allocated benefits and rein-
forced sex-based dependencies.
On the one hand, congressional approval of the ERA and of other
antidiscrimination legislation, spurred by agitation from the women's
movement, clearly played an important role in swaying the justices away
from their protectionist precedents. Brennan's plurality opinion in
Frontiero suggests that the ERA's pendency moved at least four justices to
the view that, as Brennan put it in a memorandum to Powell, "the 'suspect'
approach is the proper one and... further... now is the time, and this is
the case, to make that clear." '345 Freely admitting that the ERA's prospects
for ratification were dim, Brennan couldn't "see that we gain anything by
awaiting what is at best an uncertain outcome." '346 Decisive congressional
action on the subject was enough for Justice Byron White, too. He wrote to
his colleagues during the Frontiero deliberations: "I would think that sex
is a suspect classification, if for no other reason than the fact that Congress
has submitted a constitutional amendment making sex discrimination
unconstitutional." '347 White went on to declare that he "would remain of the
same view whether the amendment is adopted or not." '348 The language of
the Frontiero plurality opinion is likewise unambiguous on this point, mak-
ing clear that the Court's newfound recognition of a "long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination" '349 was indebted to unprecedented, tangible
congressional support of an antidiscrimination principle. It also seems
likely that the backdrop of legislative solicitude for women's rights influ-
enced the justices who went along with the result in Frontiero without en-
dorsing strict scrutiny. Absent the women's movement's renaissance and
its legislative manifestations, it is hard to imagine Justices Burger,
344. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
345. Memorandum from Brennan to Powell, supra note 312, at 1.
346. Id.
347. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Feb. 15, 1973)
(William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Part 1:299, Folder 11, on file with the Library of Congress).
348. Id.
349. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 477, 684 (1973).
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Blackmun, Stewart, and Powell spontaneously responding to feminist law-
yers' arguments.35 °
On the other hand, the dual strategy may also have limited legal femi-
nist success by restraining the Court from effectively enacting the ERA's
substance through a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
extent to which the ERA's pendency was responsible for the reluctance of
Powell, Burger, and Blackmun to endorse strict scrutiny in Frontiero is, of
course, impossible to measure. Substantive misgivings about granting sex-
based classifications the same level of review as classifications based on
race may well have underlay the concurring justices' procedural objection.
Still, in a political climate increasingly hostile toward judicial overreach-
ing, Powell's concern that "democratic institutions are weakened, and
confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear
unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political
importance at the very time they are under consideration within the pre-
scribed constitutional processes ' has at least the ring of sincerity. What-
ever these justices' motivations, there is no question that their process-
focused vision of constitutional change was a politically viable rationale
for holding back, one cognizable in the legal discourse of the day.352
The result of this impasse was the middle-ground standard articulated
in Craig,353 Intermediate scrutiny, cryptically introduced in an uninspiring
case about two-percent beer, split the difference between the strictest stan-
dard of review-embodied in the ERA and in advocates' interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment-and the old rational basis standard that per-
mitted most sex-based distinctions as a logical outgrowth of disparate gen-
der roles and immutable physical differences. Henceforth, sex-based
classifications were required to be "substantially related" to "important
governmental objectives." '354 This compromise has often been rationalized
as a recognition of the limitations of the race-sex analogy, a nod to the fact
that while racial differences are mutable, socially constructed, or imagi-
nary, sex differences are in some way "real" or biologically determined.3 55
350. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 308-13 (arguing that feminist mobilization behind an ERA was a
crucial impetus for judicial reinterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause); Eskridge, Jr., Channeling,
supra note 5, at 502 ("The power of the women's movement was such that the Court felt impelled in
the 1970s to rule unconstitutional most invidious sex discriminations.").
351. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
352. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, Il1 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002) (arguing
that the Rehnquist's Court's jurisprudence is motivated more by substantive opposition to an
"antidiscrimination agenda" than by federalism and other doctrinal values the Court's majority invokes
to support its decisions).
353. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
354. Id. at 197.
355. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) ("Supposed 'inherent
differences' are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications. Physical




Politically, though, intermediate scrutiny was also a compromise between
Justice Brennan's effective embrace of legal feminism's dual strategy, and
the position of justices who, like Justice Powell, believed that the ERA's
pendency counseled restraint. 56
A majority of the Court endorsed a more muscular "skeptical
scrutiny" in United States v. Virginia, in which the Court invalidated the
Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) policy excluding female students. 57
Now-Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, "'Inherent differences' be-
tween men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for arti-
ficial constraints on an individual's opportunity." '358 Sex classifications
were permissible if designed to compensate women for historic inequalities
and to promote equal opportunity in the present. 59 However, Ginsburg
continued, "[S]uch classifications may not be used, as they once were, to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women."
360
Not all the justices agreed. Chief Justice Rehnquist, while concurring
in the judgment, protested the majority's augmentation of intermediate
scrutiny and insisted upon the viability of a "separate-but-equal" female
alternative to VMI.361 Justice Scalia issued a vitriolic dissent in which he
suggested that if the Court were in the mood to rethink the standard of
scrutiny for gender-based classifications, a downward departure to rational
basis review was more appropriate.3 61 Still, with its six-justice majority,
Virginia represented a triumph for Justice Ginsburg, an almost complete
vindication of her 1970s crusade. VMI's all-male policy was a paradigm
example of the type of exclusion that Ginsburg's litigation campaign
sought to vanquish: the denial of a valuable educational and economic op-
portunity based upon generalizations about women that might be applica-
ble on average, but unfairly restricted the choices of individuals who
wished to flout the norm. And the new "skeptical scrutiny," with its em-
phasis on the importance of an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
any sex-based legal classification, seemed to win for women the benefits of
strict scrutiny without the drawbacks attendant to such a standard in the
356. Indeed, the Hibbs opinion cites Craig for the proposition that sex-based classifications, unlike
those based on age and disability, are subject to heightened scrutiny. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1978 (2003).
357. 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
358. Id. at 533.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
360. Id. at 558-66 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
362. Id. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was recused, presumably because his
son attended VMI. See Donald P. Baker, By One Vote, VM1 Decides to Go Coed, WASH. POST, Sept.
22, 1996, at Al.
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post-Adarand era.363 Ginsburg herself declared to a student audience
shortly after Virginia was decided, "There is no practical difference
between what has evolved and the ERA. ' '36
2. Constrained Constitutional Choices: Nguyen v. INS
Nguyen v. INS, on the other hand, illustrated both the limitations of
intermediate scrutiny as a reliable guarantor of sex-based equal protection
and the lost promise of alternative paths to constitutional equality forsaken
when legal feminists coalesced behind the dual strategy. In Nguyen, the
Court upheld an immigration statute allowing the offspring of unmarried
citizen mothers and non-citizen fathers to be naturalized automatically but
requiring children of unmarried citizen fathers and non-citizen mothers to
provide evidence of paternity.3 65 A majority ruled that the law did not con-
travene equal protection because its distinction between mothers and fa-
thers was substantially related to two important governmental
objectives: first, ensuring the existence of a biological parent-child rela-
tionship, a connection automatically verifiable in the case of mothers but
not fathers; and second, creating an opportunity for a parent-child relation-
ship to develop-an opportunity inherent in biological motherhood but not
in biological fatherhood. Since the law's differential treatment of non-
citizen mothers and non-citizen fathers was "based on the significant
difference between their respective relationships to the potential citizen at
the time of birth, '366 it was "not marked by misconception and
prejudice,' 3 67 and thus was "neither surprising nor troublesome from a
constitutional perspective. '368 Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, chastised the majority for applying
363. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
invalidate a race-based affirmative action program).
364. See Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1,
1997, § 6, at 60.
365. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). The challenged statute imposed four requirements
concerning unmarried citizen fathers that had to be satisfied in order to confer citizenship on a child
born, out of wedlock, to a non-citizen mother abroad:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and
convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the
person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2000).
366. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
367. id. at 73.
368. Id. at 63.
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an impotent version of intermediate scrutiny that vitiated the "depth and
vitality" of the Court's sex discrimination precedents.369 The challenged
statute, the dissenters argued, was "paradigmatic of a historic regime that
left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for
non-marital children.
370
Nguyen signaled the vulnerability of the robust version of intermedi-
ate scrutiny applied in Virginia and epitomized the standard's inherent mal-
leability. If the challenged citizenship law had distinguished between
parents on the basis of race rather than sex, some commentators noted, the
result reached by the Court in Nguyen would be virtually unimaginable.37
If legal feminists had succeeded in winning strict scrutiny for sex-based
classifications, either through the ERA or the Equal Protection Clause, the
law upheld in Nguyen would likely have fallen-for its lack of narrow
tailoring, if not for the absence of a compelling governmental interest. At
the very least, the Court would have been forced to justify the application
of a more deferential standard to sex-based classifications in the
immigration context.
Moreover, under more expansive versions of constitutional sex equal-
ity considered and rejected by legal feminists in the 1960s, the Nguyen ma-
jority's reasoning would have been significantly more difficult to justify.
The Nguyen Court suggested that the Equal Protection Clause demands like
treatment only where persons are "similarly situated.- 372 Since "[f]athers
and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological
parenthood," the Court found that "differential treatment is inherent in a
sensible statutory scheme." '373 Had the reigning definition of constitutional
sex equality included reproductive freedom for women, a legal distinction
premised upon the "unique relationship of the mother to the event of
birth" 374 would more likely have triggered greater, not lesser, constitutional
concern.
375
Further, had constitutional sex equality doctrine developed from a
cognizance of the profound interconnectedness between sex and other
forms of inequality, the Court-or at least its dissenters-might have fo-
cused on how the challenged law not only assumed that mothers bear the
369. Id. at 97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
371. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects, supra note 5, at 2259 ("The Court's disposition also
reflects the continued difference between race and sex distinctions in equality jurisprudence. Is there
much doubt that the Court would have overturned a law making one's citizenship turn in any way on
the race of one's American (or non-American) parent?").
372. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
373. Id. at 63-64.
374. Id. at 64.
375. Ginsburg, of course, has famously argued that reproductive rights might best have been
granted based upon sex equality rather than merely a right of privacy. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
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primary responsibility for child rearing, but also burdened foreign-born
mothers with a presumption of parental responsibility in a way that neither
citizen-mothers nor foreign-born fathers were burdened.376 Citizen-
mothers, though saddled with primary legal responsibility for their chil-
dren, could at least automatically transmit citizenship to them, and
foreign-born fathers need not take any responsibility for their progeny for
them to be naturalized. Foreign-born mothers, on the other hand, could rely
neither on a presumption of paternal responsibility nor on the transmission
of citizenship to their children when the citizen-father was, literally or figu-
ratively, missing in action. Like the African-American women plaintiffs in
White v. Crook, who suffered a unique form of disenfranchisement as a
result of their race and sex, Nguyen's mother was a potentially potent sym-
bol of the hardships borne by non-citizen women who shoulder full legal
responsibility for children fathered by American men, often military ser-
vicemen. The situation of Nguyen's mother was not, of course, directly
before the Court.3 7  Nevertheless, had Gardenia White become the Linda
Brown of sex equality jurisprudence, Ms. Nguyen's plight might have reso-
nated with the justices.378
3. The Creation of Constitutional Culture: Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs
The dual strategy's legacy lies not only in the redefinition of sex dis-
crimination under Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment; it also laid
the procedural groundwork for the Supreme Court's affirmation of
Congress's power to enact prophylactic anti-sex discrimination legislation
under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court surprised many observers by rul-
ing that the FMLA was a valid exercise of congressional power under
Section five to combat sex discrimination. One startling aspect of the ma-
jority opinion was its strikingly broad definition of constitutionally cogni-
zable sex discrimination, a definition that encompassed "stereotype-based
beliefs about the allocation of family duties" that disproportionately
376. For a searching discussion of the assumptions about maternal and paternal responsibility
underlying judicial treatment of the law upheld in Nguyen, see Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers'
Rights Are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J.
1669 (2000).
377. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 451 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that it is unclear whether an alien may assert constitutional objections while outside the United
States, and that an injury arising from discrimination "accords a basis for standing only to those persons
who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct" (citation
omitted)). The reasoning of sex discrimination cases often involves a consideration of persons not
before the Court, however. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (considering the
impact of discriminatory social security benefit allocation on plaintiff's deceased wife).
377. Gardenia White was the lead plaintiff in White v. Crook, Linda Brown was the child whose
name is memorialized in Brown v. Board of Education.
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disadvantage women in "situations in which work and family
responsibilities conflict." '379 Another was its author. Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by the four justices who had dis-
sented, with increasing vehemence, from earlier rulings curtailing congres-
sional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity through age and
disability discrimination legislation. The lone dissenter in Frontiero-not
to mention the leader of the Court's judicial supremacist wing-now up-
held a law on arguably less evidence of present-day discrimination than
was offered in Kimel," ° Morrison,3"' and Garrett,382 cases where the Court
found that Congress lacked Section five power to apply the challenged leg-
islation against the states. In doing so, Rehnquist relied upon the height-
ened scrutiny afforded sex-based classifications-in contrast to age- and
disability-related distinctions-under Craig and its progeny.
Hibbs, like Virginia, vindicated Ginsburg's substantive vision of sex
equality. While Virginia emphasized the injustice of group-based generali-
zations to individuals defying gender-role stereotypes, Hibbs stressed how
government policies perpetuated gender-based caretaking roles and exac-
erbated their disproportionate burden on women's employment opportuni-
ties.383 Less obviously, though, Hibbs also reaffirmed what might be called
the procedural legacy of 1970s legal feminism. As Robert Post persua-
sively argues, the Court's decision in Hibbs relies on a sex discrimination
jurisprudence derived not from the judicial supremacist ethos to which the
Court pays lip service, but from a line of cases heavily influenced by legis-
lative branch action.3" 4 As Post puts it, Hibbs's "extraordinarily generous
account of the constitutional harm of sex discrimination" '385 finds its roots
in the political and jurisprudential developments of the 1970s, when a plu-
rality of the Court acknowledged, in Frontiero, its own "debt to Congress's
articulation of the transformation in national understandings of the
significance of sex discrimination." '386 Though the Court's decisions in City
of Boerne v. Floresa87 and its progeny "forcefully repudiated" the
"dialectical relationship between constitutional law and constitutional
culture," Post points out that the jurisprudential underpinnings of Hibbs are
379. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (2003) (quoting Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1979 & n.5 (2003)).
380. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
381. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
382. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
383. Hibbs also vindicated Mary Anne Case's identification of anti-stereotyping as the unifying
principle of constitutional sex equality jurisprudence. See Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the
Law Condemns ": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1447 (2000).
384. Post, supra note 379, at 25-26.
385. Id. at 17.
386. Id. at 25-26.
387. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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dependent upon changes wrought by the influence of constitutional
culture.388
As this Article has demonstrated, Frontiero and its progeny derived
from a deliberate legal feminist strategy to pursue equality under the ERA
and the Fourteenth Amendment simultaneously. By embracing heightened
scrutiny as a justification for allowing Congress wider latitude to combat
discrimination through legislation, the Court not only ratified the substance
of the 1970s sex equality transformation, but also drew upon the dual strat-
egy's model of dialectical interaction between the legislative and judicial
branches in implementing constitutional change. For developments in the
legislative and political spheres to influence judicial interpretation of the
Constitution is not new, of course.389 But the legal feminists' embrace of
the dual strategy, combined with the strategy's considerable success in a
political climate increasingly hostile to judicial overreaching, forced the
Court to confront the dialectical model head-on. The Frontiero impasse
made the terms of the debate over the relationship between constitutional
culture and jurisprudence explicit, but even the justices who eschewed the
plurality's view implicitly accepted a moderated version of the dialectical
model that legal feminists promoted through their dual strategy. 90 In its
reliance on the 1970s sex discrimination cases to broadly construe congres-
sional power under the Fourteenth Amendment, then, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Hibbs might be read as implicitly accepting not only the sub-
stantive content of those precedents, but their origins in legal feminists'
dual strategy.
C. Current Constitutional Controversies and the Lessons of History
As the legal feminist experience makes clear, constitutional choices
and their consequences are both highly contingent and historically particu-
lar. Where context is so vitally important both to options and to outcomes,
the degree to which an historical episode can be generalized is necessarily
limited. As such, this final section reflects upon the similarities and the
differences between the choices facing legal feminists in the 1960s and
1970s, and those confronting contemporary advocates of constitutional
change. This discussion, which is meant to be suggestive rather than ex-
haustive, will refer to two current constitutional controversies-those
388. Post, supra note 379, at 25-29.
389. Indeed, legal feminists are not the only advocates to have pursued a dual constitutional
strategy. Earlier in the twentieth century, opponents of child labor and proponents of the income tax
followed a similar path, and both eventually succeeded in altering the constitutional landscape. For
more on these crusades, see BERRY, supra note 9; STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW (1968); Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1999).
390. Cf Eskridge, Jr., Channeling, supra note 5, at 503 (noting that "social movements can
contribute to changes in the doctrinal structure of constitutional inquiry").
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concerning reproductive freedom and gay rights. While the historical par-
ticularity of social movements and their political and legal contexts means
that specific strategic challenges will inevitably differ, the interplay be-
tween various modes of legal change and the reciprocal impact of constitu-
tional choices on internal social movement dynamics are common to
today's debates.
Many of the practical difficulties associated with dual constitutional
strategies are likely to extend beyond the particular context of legal femi-
nism. Ironically, the present-day dilemma most similar to that of the legal
feminists may be the predicament faced by anti-abortion advocates who
seek constitutional recognition of fetal rights. Activists opposed to abortion
have promoted constitutional amendments declaring that human life begins
at conception since the mid-1970s.391 At the same time, they have lobbied
for restrictions on abortion at the state and federal levels and argued for a
reinterpretation of existing constitutional provisions. Fighting to overturn
Roe v. Wade while attempting to pass a constitutional amendment is a dual
strategy with similar drawbacks to the legal feminists' approach. As one
pro-life proponent puts it, the proposed Human Life Amendment (HLA) is
a "double-edged sword." '392 From an anti-abortion perspective, the amend-
ment "may preserve human life and diminish the culture of death." '393 But
some might "consider HLA a tacit approval of the construction of the Due
Process Clause that has produced Roe and Dred Scott," with consequences
not only for the jurisprudence of abortion, but also for the death penalty,
assisted suicide, euthanasia, and infanticide.394 Seeking Article V amend-
ment, in other words, may carry with it the implication that reigning consti-
tutional interpretations are correct. On the other hand, the success of such
391. See, e.g., Republican National Committee, Republican Platform: Prosperity, Self
Government and 'Moral Clarity,' 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC D-21, D-28 (1996) ("The unborn child has a
fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We support a human life amendment to
the Constitution and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections
apply to unborn children."); Human Life Amendment, S. 158, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981), providing:
The Congress finds that present day scientific evidence indicates a significant
likelihood that actual human life exists from conception. The Congress further
finds that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States was
intended to protect all human beings. Upon the basis of these findings, and in the
exercise of the powers of the Congress, including its power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Congress
hereby declares that for the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the States
under the fourteenth amendment not to deprive persons of life without due
process of law, human life shall be deemed to exist from conception, without
regard to race, sex, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency, and for this
purpose 'person' shall include all human life as defined herein.
392. Paolo Torzilli, Note, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human Life, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 225 (2000); see Human Life Amendment,
supra note 391.
393. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
394. Id.
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an amendment in gaining congressional backing could also strengthen the
case for judicial reinterpretation of existing constitutional provisions under
a dialectical model of constitutional change.
Despite sharing some of the practical difficulties legal feminists faced
in advancing a dual strategy, anti-abortion advocacy lacks some of the key
characteristics of legal feminism. For one, although anti-abortion advocates
themselves are not a beleaguered, discrete and insular minority entitled to
Carolene Products protection, they claim to speak for one-namely, un-
born children. They may avoid, therefore, the legal feminists' dilemma of
claiming judicial solicitude despite numerical majority status. Further,
abortion opponents-at least those who are willing to accept a renunciation
of Roe without an absolute protection of fetal rights-may style themselves
as traditionalists, seeking not a revolutionary new interpretation of the
Constitution, but rather a restoration of its rightful meaning. This is a sig-
nificant advantage because it enables anti-abortion advocates to steer clear
of accusations that the constitutional change they seek through litigation
lacks democratic legitimacy. In fact, they can and do argue exactly the op-
posite-that they are seeking to reverse an illegitimate, anti-majoritarian
episode of judicial aggrandizement. Advocates of reproductive freedom, on
the other hand, are left to defend the constitutional status quo without the
presumptive legitimacy preservationists usually enjoy.
Theoretically, one could also imagine advocates of gay rights pursu-
ing a dual constitutional strategy-seeking an amendment prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation while litigating for
recognition of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Of course,
lesbians' and gay men's status as a numerical minority makes this a less
attractive strategy than it was for feminists. 395 Still, although gay rights ad-
vocates have not promoted an amendment to the federal Constitution, they
have simultaneously pursued rights-securing legislation and judicial rein-
terpretation of existing constitutional provisions at both the state and fed-
eral levels.396 And gay rights advocates might have more success pursuing
dual constitutional strategies in selected states where there is more support
395. Some scholars have argued that constitutional amendment is no longer a viable or desirable
mode of achieving constitutional change. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., Channeling, supra note 5, at 499.
Kathleen Sullivan has argued that constitutional amendment is often unwise and in some cases may be
counterproductive for advocates. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress
Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 704 (1996). Others, like David
Kyvig, warn that without formal textual emendation, constitutional change is ephemeral. See DAVID E.
KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995 (1996). On
the constitutional amendment process more generally, see RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); JOHN R.
VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992).
396. In an intriguing development, the constitutional battle over gay rights is also being fought at
the local level, as city and county officials defy state laws by granting marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. See Michael Hill, Judge Tells New Paltz Mayor to Halt Same-Sex Marriages, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Mar. 6, 2004, at A3.
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for equality and where antidiscrimination legislation has been enacted at
the state level.
3 97
Anti-gay advocates are pursuing what might be called a dual strategy,
but to advance a preservationist, rather than a progressive, agenda for con-
stitutional change. Anti-gay groups have sponsored initiatives aimed at
preventing same-sex marriage; scuttling domestic partnership laws; pre-
serving the prerogatives of public and private entities to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing, education, and other
benefits; preventing the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation; and
more. They have done so through federal, state, and local legislation,
through proposed federal and state constitutional amendments, and through
litigation positions defending conservative judicial interpretations of exist-
ing constitutional provisions.398 Unlike gay rights and anti-abortion advo-
cates, anti-gay activists do not claim to speak on behalf of a discrete and
insular minority. But like the anti-abortion movement, anti-gay groups
claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy, and more than abortion oppo-
nents, they argue for the constitutional status quo. Thus, while they may
confront the practical problem of arguing for a constitutional amendment to
establish a principle they claim is already constitutionally secured, anti-gay
advocates do not face the same obstacles as do proponents of progressive
constitutional change.
Identity-based or not, progressive or preservationist, majority or mi-
nority, all advocates seeking constitutional change must grapple with the
difficulties associated with uniting diverse groups of activists behind a co-
herent constitutional and political agenda. In this way, the legal feminist
experience is a cautionary tale. Legal feminists' abandonment of more ex-
pansive visions of constitutional change highlights how the internal dy-
namics of social movements, interacting with external political
imperatives, may reduce activists' aspirations to their lowest common de-
nominator.3 99 For legal feminists, that meant compromising definitions of
constitutional sex equality that encompassed reproductive rights, explicitly
embraced racial and economic diversity, and prohibited private
397. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003). Of course, judicial
reinterpretation of existing state constitutional provisions carries with it enormous political risks,
galvanizing opposition including, in the case of same-sex marriage, a federal constitutional amendment
counterinsurgency. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
398. For a survey of such efforts, see the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Marriage Center,
at http://www.ngltf.org/marriagecenter/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004); see also James Dao, State
Action is Pursued on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at A24.
399. Eskridge has argued persuasively that a "clever judicial strategy... channels [a social]
movement's discourse in assimilative directions." See Eskridge, Jr., Channeling, supra note 5, at 423.
The legal feminist story suggests that in formulating legal strategy, social movements themselves may
begin this process of assimilative channeling. Cf Risa L. Goluboff, "We Live's in a Free House Such
as It Is ": Class and the Creation of Modern Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1977 (2003) (uncovering
class-based claims the NAACP did not pursue in the 1940s).
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discrimination. In the context of the broader women's movement, the alter-
native visions left behind were well within the mainstream of feminism,00
but they nevertheless appeared threatening to the older, more conservative
women who had long carried the banner of formal legal equality. Losing
the support of those women, the time-honored liaisons between legal femi-
nism and Congress, in turn threatened the political viability of proposed
constitutional changes.
Coalition-building imperatives entail analogous costs for contempo-
rary social movements. Advocates concerned with the status of gay, les-
bian, bisexual, and transgendered Americans are a famously diverse group
with widely varying ideological perspectives and practical priorities. The
extent to which legal advocacy organizations concentrate resources on le-
galizing same-sex marriage may not only limit the time and money avail-
able to other causes, but also tends to privilege particular notions of
equality over others. Many queer theorists and some gay rights legal advo-
cates have criticized the pro-gay marriage movement as narrow, assimila-
tionist, and oppressive of alternative sexualities."" The marginalization of
these other conceptions of equality and freedom may be the cost of consen-
sus. On the other hand, just as the legal feminists' constitutional strategiz-
ing reconfigured old internal divisions and reshaped the meaning of
equality, the political connotations of same-sex marriage may be trans-
formed through constitutional contestation. As some conservatives level
increasingly vituperative attacks against lesbian and gay relationships, gay
rights advocates may not only put their own differences aside, but also may
redefine marriage as a transformative, rather than merely traditional or as-
similative, institution.402 For, as the legal feminist experience reveals, con-
stitutional choices are also profoundly constitutive. Not only do advocates'
choices shape the conceptions of equality available to courts and other
400. More radical and separatist feminist theories often eschewed the legal system altogether. For
more on radical feminism, see, for example, ECHOLS, supra note 173. Eskridge argues that equal
protection doctrine itself privileged social movement moderates at the expense of radicals. See
Eskridge, Jr., Channeling, supra note 5, at 487-88. For an argument that the radical/liberal feminist
dichotomy was more fluid than movement historians have generally recognized, see Deborah Dinner,
Transforming Family and State: Women's Vision for Universal Childcare, 1966-1971 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
401. For a sampling of views, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); MICHAEL WARNER, THE
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999); Douglas NeJaime,
Note, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of
Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511 (2003); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 567 (1994); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
402. See Tamar Lewin, Marriage-Minded: The Gay Rights Movement, Settled Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 5 (quoting sexuality historian George Chauncey, who notes that "[m]arriage can
look like the most assimilationist gesture possible or, as has become obvious from the reaction, like the
most transgressive and revolutionary gesture.").
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decisionmakers, but the act of choosing between constitutional options also
constructs the social movements that mobilize for change.
CONCLUSION
In coalescing around a dual constitutional strategy, legal feminists
overcame internal divisions, abandoned reprehensible alliances, and fash-
ioned a coherent agenda for change. Though they relinquished racialist rea-
soning, they also sacrificed more expansive visions of equality at the altar
of unity and prudence. Their pragmatic approach to constitutional revision
succeeded in unifying disparate factions but created new practical dilem-
mas. Simultaneous litigation and amendment advocacy, while mutually
reinforcing to some, was procedurally problematic to others. Legal femi-
nists' dual strategy, with all of its triumphs and shortfalls, leaves a dis-
cernible legacy in today's jurisprudence, underscoring the high stakes-
both for law and for social movements-of constitutional choices.
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